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Abstract 
The Indian Ocean Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004 prompted a level of international 
disaster response that was unprecedented. In Aceh, Indonesia, the worst hit 
region, thousands of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), 
including some New Zealand based NGOs, arrived in the area to carry out relief 
and reconstruction work. A common criticism of the international response is that 
it has resulted in the marginalisation of Acehnese women. The criticism comes 
despite at least fifteen years of gender mainstreaming into the policies and 
practices of development organisations and the widespread acceptance that 
attention to gender issues is essential for sustainable and equitable 
development. It also comes at a time when there is ever-increasing demand for 
NGO accountability to donors and beneficiaries and a recognition that NGOs 
should continuously be learning to improve future practice and ensure they are 
meeting their stated goals. 
Post-tsunami Aceh posed a number of context-specific challenges to the 
implementation of gender policies, including the enormous extent of the 
devastation, the history of violent conflict and the rule of Sharia law. This 
research investigates the particular challenges and experiences workers of NZ-
based NGOs faced in implementing their gender policies in the aftermath of the 
tsunami in Aceh, and how those NGOs responded to the challenges and 
experiences to ensure lessons have been learned. It also investigates whether 
any obstacles to learning lessons exist within those organisations. 
Qualitative research is used including gathering primary data from semi-
structured interviews with individuals from five NZ NGOs that worked in Aceh and 
with representatives of NGOs willing to comment on their organisational 
responses. Additional comments on the issues are also obtained from two NZAID 
(New Zealand Agency for International Development) staff. The findings show 
that while participants faced numerous gender-related challenges in their work in 
Aceh, approximately three years after the tsunami none were able to point to any 
specific gender-related lessons learned. The findings also reveal that 
participating NGOs tend to draw learning from their international affiliates and 
from the NZ NGO community rather than having structured learning systems 
within their own organisations. A number of barriers to learning within 
organisations are also identified. These results, while not necessarily 
representative of the wider NZ NGO community, reveal the difficulties of trying to 
implement gender policies in a particular emergency context and contribute to an 
understanding of how NZ NGOs are involved in a process of continuous learning 
to incorporate their own experiences to ensure lessons are learned and improve 
their accountability. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami on 26 December 2004, and the earthquake that 
triggered it, killed approximately 275,000 people worldwide. 165,000 of those 
deaths were in Aceh, a semi-autonomous, strictly Islamic, region in Indonesia. 
It was the worst hit area of all seventeen countries affected by the tsunami. 
The losses and damage there were estimated to be US$4.5 million (Telford & 
Cosgrave, 2006). In addition to those who lost their lives in Aceh, a further 
500,000 people were displaced from their homes (BRR, 2005) and 600 ,000 
lost their livelihoods. The scale of the disaster was enormous but the 
international response that followed was unprecedented (Telford & Cosgrave, 
2006). Over US$14 billion in funding was raised internationally.1 Not only was 
that level of funding extraordinary, but so was the number of responding 
organisations. According to Schulze (2005), in Aceh alone over 3000 
Indonesian and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) were 
registered to work in the early months after the tsunami. 
Following the disaster, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), comprised of 
a number of donor countries and UN agencies, was established to evaluate 
the international response. The TEC, in its 'Joint Evaluation of the 
International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami ', concluded that lessons 
have not been learned by INGOs from experience and that they failed to meet 
their commitments to basic humanitarian principles such as the Sphere 
Standards.2 The TEC report goes so far as to allege: "at best, the international 
response restored the 'status quo ante'. At worst, it strengthened those who 
were better off and/or more articulate ... while marginalising those who had 
few assets, notably women and the most poor" (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006, p. 
20). 
1 Source: http://www.tsunami-evalutaion .org/ 
2 Sphere, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response developed in 
2000, and discussed further on page 4. 
Numerous other reports have emerged from academic institutions, NGOs, 
governments, UN bodies, and the women of Aceh themselves, that to varying 
degrees support the TEC findings and criticise the international response for 
its failure to address gender inequality, and actually succeed in further 
marginalising women in the reconstruction process. 3 These hefty criticisms 
come despite the fact that gender awareness has been of paramount 
importance in humanitarian and development circles since at least the early 
1990s. By that time most development organisations had embraced gender 
mainstreaming (Longwe, 1999), a process whereby gender considerations are 
integrated systematically into all organisational policies and procedures. 
A focus on gender is about recognising the various dynamics and power 
imbalances that exist between the genders and how those impact on things 
such as personal security, access to resources and participation in decision-
making processes, particularly in the aftermath of a disaster. Consideration of 
gender issues is a crucial element of effective disaster response and longer-
term development. Experience has shown that inattention to gender-related 
vulnerabilities and inequalities seriously threatens sustainable development. 
The power dynamics that exist between men and women, and the 
institutional, political, religious and social structures that underlie them, have 
to be addressed if INGOs are to achieve their stated goals of alleviating 
suffering, eradicating poverty, empowering the vulnerable and so on. 
Just having gender policies is not enough however. Consistently, INGOs 
struggle to translate their gender policies into practice, especially in 
emergency contexts when the pressure is greatest, as was demonstrated 
most recently and markedly in the post-tsunami response in Aceh. No two 
emergency contexts are quite alike and there has been growing recognition 
that gender policies must be adaptable to different local contexts. To 
effectively address gender inequalities, organisations need to have regard to 
the cultural and social realities in which those inequalities have become 
embedded (Iddi, 1999). Aceh is characterised by a number of context-specific 
3 See for example HRC (2005) and Eye on Aceh (2006). 
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factors that presented enormous challenges to the implementation of gender 
policies in the post-tsunami environment. These include: 
• Its relative proximity to the earthquake that caused the tsunami. It 
therefore suffered extensive damage and loss of life. Even the most 
experienced INGOs were pushed to their limits to supply the required 
levels of aid. The urgency of post-disaster situations is often cited as a 
reason why organisations fail to take proper account of gender 
issues.4 
• Aceh's history of violent conflict. Prior to the tsunami Aceh had 
experienced a long running and violent secessionist movement, and 
few international organisations were permitted to have a presence 
there. The people of Aceh were already poor and vulnerable and in 
many cases had suffered abuse at the hands of the Indonesian Army 
(HRC, 2005). Women are usually the most adversely impacted by 
conflict and insufficient attention was paid by INGOs to their needs as 
conflict victims (Umar, Ismail, Djalil, & Dewy, 2006). 
• The rule of Sharia law. In 2005, about 6 months after the tsunami, 
Aceh, which for hundreds of years has been strongly Muslim, 
legislated for a stricter form of Islamic law. While Sharia law itself is 
considered to promote gender equality, women in Aceh allege that it is 
being interpreted and implemented by those in power in a way that is 
heavily discriminatory towards women. 5 It places restrictions on their 
freedom and their ability to participate fully in the reconstruction 
process. 
The TEC noted a lack of awareness and understanding by INGOs in Aceh of 
the local context in which they were operating (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). It 
is not surprising that the TEC has made renewed calls for a regulatory system 
4 See for example Eye on Aceh (2006). 
5 Source: Discussions with representatives of local women's organisations in Aceh, January 
2007. 
3 
for the international humanitarian community to be implemented so that the 
accountability of INGOs might be improved. It is not the first time such calls 
have been made. About ten years ago, in 1997, ALNAP (Active Learning 
Network for Humanitarian Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action)6 was established following an evaluation of the crisis in Rwanda in 
1994 where the international humanitarian community was also criticised for 
its response . ALNAP was established to improve the learning, accountability 
and performance of humanitarian organisations in emergencies. It was a 
response to calls for some kind of regulation of the humanitarian sector, which 
had up to that point been answerable to nobody. While INGOs shied away 
from regulation as such , there was a considerable level of commitment 
indicated by organisations to the Sphere Standards which were developed as 
agreed basic principles for organisations engaging in emergency responses 
(Buchanan-Smith , 2003).7 Yet in post-tsunami Aceh, INGOs failed to adhere 
to those standards. 
To be accountable, organisations need to be able to reflect on how they have 
performed in practice, and draw lessons that can then be translated into 
improved future performance. While many 'Lessons Learned ' reports have 
been written ,8 the real test as to whether those lessons have in fact been 
learned rather than simply recorded then stored away somewhere with 
countless other documents, will come the next time organisations engage in a 
disaster response. Organisations need to commit time and resources to 
actively learning on an ongoing basis. They need to have systems in place to 
capture learning from the field and feed it back into policies and practices. The 
Indian Ocean Tsunami has once again exposed the apparent inability of 
INGOs to learn lessons. As Fowler (1997, p. 64) once stated: NGOs have a 
"limited capacity to learn, adapt and continuously improve the quality of what 
they do". 
6 http://www.alnap.org/ 
7 The Sphere Standards identify gender as a cross-cutting issue, which indicates its relevance 
and importance within all other aspects of humanitarian work. 
8 See for example UN (2005b). 
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Research Questions 
A number of New Zealand (NZ) based NGOs, were involved in the tsunami 
response in Aceh. Consistent with the traditional approach of NZ NGOs, for 
the most part their contribution was limited to providing funding through their 
international affiliates and partners on the ground. However, seven of the 
seventeen organisations that participated in the tsunami response did send 
staff to work in Aceh. Given the criticisms that have emerged about the overall 
response, and particularly the issues around gender, the purpose of this case 
study is to reveal and analyse the experiences of a selection of NZ NGOs in 
Aceh and to find out how the NGOs have used those experiences to ensure 
lessons are being learned to improve future performance. It also seeks to 
identify any barriers to learning that might exist within organisations. 
The research therefore asks: 
1. What were the challenges and experiences faced by workers of 
NZ NGOs in the implementation of their gender policies while 
engaging in relief and reconstructions activities in post-tsunami 
Aceh? 
2. How have the NGOs responded to those challenges and 
experiences to ensure lessons have been learned to improve 
future practice? 
3. What, if any, obstacles exist to learning lessons within 
organisations? 
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Figure 1 below shows how this research draws on the three broad subject 
areas discussed above: gender and development, post-tsunami Aceh and 
organisational learning. The research questions focus on the middle triangle 
where the three circles overlap. 
Figure 1: Research Focus 
Gender & 
Development 
This research is important because the Indian Ocean Tsunami was a major 
event that tested INGOs considerably, and certainly tested their ability to 
implement their gender policies and adhere to agreed humanitarian standards 
around gender. Subsequent evaluations have revealed they fell short of those 
standards. In a climate where there are increasing demands for NGO 
accountability to both donors and beneficiaries, NGOs need to be able to 
demonstrate that they are in fact learning lessons from disasters such as the 
tsunami and are committing themselves to improving their performance. It is 
particularly important for NZ NGOs, as recent trends show they are expanding 
their capacity to be operational in humanitarian emergencies whereas 
traditionally they have been funding organisations only. This research 
provides a glimpse into how, and the extent to which, some NZ NGOs are 
engaged in a process of learning to improve their performance in light of the 
context-specific, gender-related individual experiences of a sma" selection of 
development professionals who worked in Aceh. 
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Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter Two is a 
review of the literature on the three broad subject areas covered in this 
research: gender and development; post-tsunami Aceh; and organisational 
learning. It discusses the importance of gender policies in post-disaster 
contexts, and identifies some of the reasons why there are persistent 
problems in implementing them in practice. A variety of reports on the tsunami 
response in Aceh are reviewed, which helps to describe the specific context in 
which this research is positioned. Finally, there is a review of the literature on 
organisational learning, which looks at how organisations learn lessons and 
identifies some of the barriers to learning. 
Chapter Three provides some background information on Aceh and on the 
multiple impacts of the tsunami there. It describes in some detail a number of 
context-specific factors and explains how those directly and indirectly affected 
relief and reconstruction efforts, particularly in respect of gender issues. The 
chapter also briefly explains my personal positioning in this research based on 
a two month visit to Aceh from late 2006 to early 2007. 
Chapter Four outlines the methodology used to undertake this study. It 
describes the qualitative nature of the research and identifies the various 
sources of information used. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the 
ethical requirements and an acknowledgement of the limitations of the 
research. 
Chapter Five presents my findings. For the most part the participants' own 
words have been used to describe their experiences. Responses are grouped 
according to themes along with analysis focussed on answering the three 
research questions. 
Chapter Six provides concluding comments and tentative recommendations in 
light of the findings. It draws together the main points and identifies some 
potential areas for further research. 
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Chapter Two 
What the Literature Says 
Introduction 
This research examines whether and how lessons have been learned about 
gender by a selection of NZ-based NGOs involved in the tsunami response in 
Aceh. It seeks to understand how NZ NGOs have learned lessons about 
gender from the field to ensure ongoing improvements in the quality of their 
disaster response and development work. The research deals with three 
distinct subjects areas: gender and development; the gender-related aspects 
of the tsunami response in Aceh; and organisational learning. 
I begin with gender and development and provide only a broad overview of 
the development of thinking on that subject, and then focus on literature that 
deals with gender in post-disaster or post-conflict situations, as these are 
most relevant to the Aceh context and to the research questions. The 
literature that has emerged directly out of the international humanitarian 
response to the tsunami in Aceh is reviewed next. I have chosen a selection 
of reports that deal with gender-related aspects of the response, and only 
reports that in whole or part focus specifically on Aceh. The reports selected 
come from a variety of sources including academic institutions, NGOs, 
governments and UN bodies. The final section on organisational learning 
looks at how organisations learn lessons and translate those lessons into 
improved practice. The literature reviewed includes not only learning in 
development organisations but also in government bodies, as there are 
principles that apply more generally. 
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Gender and Development 
Gender Mainstreaming 
A review of gender and development literature shows the emergence of 
gender as a central theme of development in the last fifteen to twenty years. 
That is not to say that there was no gender awareness in the development 
context before that, but typically, gender considerations were a side issue, 
and any attention to gender primarily meant a focus on women. Early 
literature on women and development was predominantly concerned with the 
negative impacts of development on women (Staudt, 1997). To address those 
negative impacts, an approach known as Women in Development, or WID, 
emerged in the 1970s. WID sought to address the relative disadvantaged 
position of women by actively targeting them in development approaches. By 
the 1990s, WID had largely been replaced by GAD, or Gender and 
Development, as the dominant approach. The shift in approach represented a 
change in thinking about how to address gender inequality, from a focus on 
women to a focus on gender and the relationship between women and men 
(Jddi, 1999). Staudt (1997, p. 10; Umar et aI., 2006) defines gender as "a 
social construct that differentiates men and women in ways that become 
embedded and institutionalised in the political and bureaucratic authority of 
the state. Women rarely have a voice in conceptualising such institutional 
forms." The GAD approach sought to address gender inequality by trying to 
understand and transform those underlying power structures. This shift in 
approach required a change in the fundamental way that development 
organisations conceived of development and the way they operated, rather 
than simply adding a new dimension to their operations. As discussed further 
below, such changes have not been rapid or widespread and in fact in some 
cases, there has been no change at all. 
A major strategy that emerged from the GAD approach was gender 
mainstreaming, that is, the incorporation of gender considerations into all 
aspects of policy and practice of development organisations. The last fifteen 
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or so years have seen a process of gender mainstreaming by humanitarian 
and development organisations (Longwe, 1999). But many authors suggest 
that for one reason or another, there is little reason to celebrate progress 
made. Recent literature suggests that the process of gender mainstreaming is 
not yet complete (Bazinet & Sequeira, 2006). Some authors argue that even 
the shift from WID to GAD has not been achieved (MacDonald, 2003) and 
there remains in some organisations an inability to shift the focus from women 
to gender. MacDonald, who analysed gender mainstreaming in the UK 
Department for International Development, considers the main barrier to 
mainstreaming gender is the lack of institutionalisation; that is, an absence of 
proper systems within organisations to ensure gender issues are considered 
at all levels. 
Ensuring due consideration is given to gender from policy development to 
implementation and evaluation is imperative to the goal of addressing gender 
inequality. If it is not written into policy and procedure it is unlikely to have 
much impact in practice given all the other pressing concerns of development 
practice. On the other hand, simply writing it into policy is not going to 
translate into practice on the ground unless time and resources are invested 
in training staff to implement the policy. Similarly, unless frameworks are in 
place for gender to be an integral part of follow up monitoring and evaluation 
of development work, there is no way of knowing whether policies have been 
effective in achieving their stated goal. 
Even though some authors say the shift from WID to GAD is incomplete, 
others consider there is already a waning of interest in gender issues. 
Jacquette and Staudt (2006) refer to this as "GAD fatigue". Others note a 
distinct loss of momentum in the drive to address gender inequality since the 
mid-1990s (Hunt, 2004). MacDonald (2003) observed a decrease in the level 
of resources allocated to gender equality. Such observations are concerning 
because as the understanding of gender and power structures that 
marginalise women increases, it appears organisations are lacking incentives 
or finding it too difficult to do anything about it. In theory authors agree gender 
mainstreaming is important, but in reality implementation is problematic. 
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Implementation 
Literature written in the late 1990s and early in the 2000s started to recognise 
that while many organisations had gender policies, there were difficulties in 
implementing them (Longwe, 1999; Moser & Moser, 2005). Seeking to 
address underlying power structures is more complex than designing projects 
that target women, because not only do the respective needs, roles and 
interests of men and women need to be taken into account but also the 
underlying political, social and religious structures that cause and sustain 
inequality. Seeking to address gender is a more holistic approach than 
targeting women and therefore requires a much more significant investment of 
effort and resources at all levels. For many NGOs their size and budget 
constraints are likely barriers. 
A number of reasons are suggested in the literature as to why implementation 
of gender policies remains problematic given the years of mainstreaming. One 
is that policies tend to be top-down and developed far removed from the 
realities of practice, by people who themselves have no field experience 
(Hilhorst, 2002; Hovland, 2003). The conflict between theorists and 
researchers and the actual needs of practitioners is one of the major debates 
identified in development literature (Jacquette & Summerfield, 2006). Another 
reason suggested is that staff are insufficiently trained to implement policies 
(Hunt, 2004; Porter & Smith, 1998) or the gender training they receive is not 
sufficiently adapted to the realities of a given situation (Porter & Smith, 1998; 
Rowan-Campbell, 1999). The urgency of post-disaster emergency situations 
is also commonly advanced as a reason why gender policies are not 
implemented in practice. Taking gender into account is sometimes considered 
to require too much effort that slows things down in an emergency (Cupples, 
2007; Eye on Aceh, 2006). The literature provides plenty of reasons why 
successful implementation is problematic. Harder to find are concrete 
examples of what does work and how gender policies can be implemented 
successfully in a variety of circumstances. 
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It is difficult to find what does work because insufficient attention is paid by 
organisations to monitoring and evaluating their policies to assess their 
effectiveness in addressing gender inequality (Brambilla, 2001; Moser & 
Moser, 2005). A number of authors say there is no systematic assessment of 
the impact of gender policies and whether they achieve what they set out to 
achieve (Brambilla, 2001; Jahan, 1995; MacDonald, 2003). MacDonald noted 
there is little evidence to show how evaluations are followed up and fed back 
into policy/project design. It is not clear whether this is a gap in organisational 
practice or a gap in the literature. 
Gender and Disaster 
This thesis is concerned with gender in a specific context, that is, post-
disaster and post-conflict in Aceh. A review of the disaster/conflict literature 
shows that the gendered dimensions of such phenomena are increasingly 
analysed, with a growing recognition of the need for organisations to respond 
with policies and practices that are not just sensitive to those dimensions but 
that have gender considerations at their heart. Policies that do not have 
proper regard to gender can be ineffective at best and even harmful to long-
term development aims (Gell, 1999; Whitbread, 2005). 
Attention needs to be paid, not just to the different needs of men and women 
in post-disaster/post-conflict contexts but also to the underlying causes of 
gender inequalities (Cupples, 2007; Abirafeh, 2005). This requires 
organisations to consider longer term, more strategic approaches to gender 
issues in their relief and development activities. It requires them to go beyond 
simply designing technical responses that meet women's immediate practical 
needs such as providing sanitary products in emergencies for example. 
Strategic needs relate more to women's relatively disadvantaged position in a 
given society and require a response that may be more political. The 
distinction between practical and strategic gender needs was first made by 
Molynuex (1985) and has since been adopted by many other authors as a 
way of conceptualising different levels of need and therefore the different 
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planning approaches required to address them (Moser, 1993; Ostergaard, 
1992) 
While there are difficulties in taking gender into account from the outset in any 
humanitarian response, Gell (1999) suggests there is also acknowledgement 
that gender issues cannot be ignored in emergency contexts. Unless attention 
is paid to gender considerations from the outset, through deliberate and 
targeted measures, valuable opportunities to ensure long term sustainability 
and peace can be lost (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2005) and there is a risk of 
increased gender stereotyping that exacerbates existing inequalities (Pittaway 
et ai, 2007). Abirafeh (2005, p. 10) describes a serious risk of a "retreat to 
conservative notions of masculinity and femininity". 
However, one study that has analysed several post-conflict areas, provides 
evidence that gender ideologies are not easily shifted and that in post-conflict 
situations at least, there may be a limit to the extent to which it is possible to 
change power structures beyond the household level (EI-Bushra & EI-Karib, 
2002). 
"Interventions aiming to take the opportunity of rapid change in conflict 
and post-conflict situations to encourage transformations in gender 
relations may therefore be unrealistic. Conflict may create space to 
make a redefinition of social relations possible, but in doing so it 
rearranges, adapts or reinforces patriarchal ideologies, rather than 
fundamentally changing them." (p. 10) 
The findings of the study do not necessarily contradict what other authors are 
saying about the need to take advantage of post-disaster or post-conflict 
situations to address gender inequalities, but it does suggests some 
limitations to what is possible. Further studies of this nature would be useful 
for identifying whether the same is true in post-disaster situations and what 
other factors may be important. 
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The concept of gender differs throughout the world. The political, social and 
religious environments in which gender is conceived vary. So a 'one size fits 
all' approach is inadequate when it comes to gender policies. Policies need to 
be flexible enough to adapt to the realities of different situations (Kabeer, 
1999). A gender policy developed in a head office in a Western country is 
unlikely to be relevant or applicable to all situations. Different places require 
different approaches that take into account the context specific factors. 
Gender policies for post-disaster situations may look quite different to policies 
for long-term development. Authors note that particular attention needs to be 
paid to gender dynamics as they emerge in different contexts (Abirafeh , 2005; 
Cupples, 2007). 
Jacquette and Summerfield (2006) note there is very little literature that deals 
with how to address gender in 'increasingly violent and culturally politicised' 
contexts. We live in a world where emergencies are increasingly complex. 
Conflict and disaster in many places have become inextricably linked. So 
there is a constant challenge to relief and development organisations to 
develop and adapt gender policies that will be effective in new and more 
complex environments in which they operate. The Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee produced a 'Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action' in 2006,9 
after the tsunami , which sets standards for the integration of gender issues 
from the outset of complex emergencies. The handbook emphasises that 
gender equality is not a luxury in that context; it is essential to sustainable 
development. While learning what the local gender related conditions are and 
adapting policies and practices to fit appropriately can take time, the 
handbook stresses that it is realistic and necessary to consider gender issues 
in an emergency situation . 
Two risks of trying to ensure gender policies can be relevant in a variety of 
situations are apparent that are not comprehensively covered in the literature 
reviewed. First, there may be a risk that gender policies are deliberately kept 
broad and vague to try to ensure they can be relevant in any situation, which 
9 Available online at: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/gender . 
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is likely to render them ineffective and meaningless. Alternatively, policies 
might be so closely adapted to a local political or religious context that the 
fundamental goal of gender policy, which is the eradication of gender 
inequality, is not achievable. 
Summary 
The literature reviewed on gender and development and gender and disaster 
discusses the emergence of gender as a central theme in development 
practice. It offers some explanations as to why organisations struggle to 
implement gender policies in practice and it provides some understanding of 
the issues responding humanitarian organisations are faced with in their post-
disaster responses. They are: 
1. The need to recognise the gendered dimensions of disasters, that is, 
the ways in which a disaster impacts differently on men and women. 
2. The need to appreciate the difference between immediate, practical 
gender needs and the complex, underlying gender dynamics or the 
longer term strategic gender needs, and respond accordingly. 
3. The challenge to address gender from the outset even in the urgency 
of the relief phase. 
4. The need to be realistic about the extent to which change is actually 
possible in a post-conflict situation. 
5. The importance of understanding the local context and gender 
dynamics and be able to adapt gender policies to make them relevant 
and effective. 
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The Tsunami Response in Aceh 
As would be expected after such a major event, numerous reports have 
emerged evaluating the international response to the Tsunami. The reports 
come from a variety of sources including NGOs that responded, independent 
non-profit organisations, governments, UN bodies such as UNDP, 
multilaterals like the World Bank, and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), 
an organisation set up to assess the tsunami response. The reports evaluate 
all aspects of the international response but this review looks at a selection of 
reports that have discussed gender issues and that deal specifically with 
Aceh. 
Perhaps the most damning overall comment has come from the TEC 
Synthesis Report, which states, "at best, the international response restored 
the 'status quo ante'. At worst, it strengthened those who were better off 
and/or more articulate, such as fishermen who possessed boats, while 
marginalizing those who had few assets, notably women and the most poor" 
(Telford & Cosgrave, 2006, p. 20). In other words, according to the TEC, 
which is made up of a number of donor organisations from around the world, 
the result of the international tsunami response has been the very thing that 
organisations strive to counter in their humanitarian work, that is the 
marginalisation of the vulnerable. 
The TEC Synthesis Report noted that one of the major weaknesses in the 
response was a poor understanding of local contexts, including the dynamics 
of the armed conflict in Aceh. Other reports echo this finding. The TEC 
concludes that few lessons have been learned from experience and that 
organisations did not meet their commitments to principles such as Sphere. 10 
As a result, the TEC sees the need for better accountability and makes a clear 
call for a regulatory system for the international humanitarian community to be 
10 The Sphere Standards were developed by the international humanitarian community in 
response to the Rwanda Crisis, in an effort to improve the quality of humanitarian 
engagement. 
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put in place. Regulation has been an ongoing debate in the international 
development community since the mid to late 1990s, following the last major 
failure of the international humanitarian community in the Rwanda crisis. 
All of the reports reviewed (except perhaps an Oxfam Report, discussed 
further below, called The Tsunami's Impact on Women' 2005, written just a 
few months after the tsunami, and focusing on the gendered impacts of the 
tsunami rather than on the humanitarian response) are united in their criticism 
of the international humanitarian organisation response with regard to gender 
issues. The reports point to many of the same problems identified in the 
gender and development literature reviewed above. They criticise both INGOs 
and the Indonesian government for failing to actively include women or take 
account of women's particular needs in their activities both in the relief and 
subsequent reconstruction phases (See for example: Schulze, 2005; Eye On 
Aceh, 2006). The Badan Pelaksana Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR), the 
Indonesian government agency charged with coordinating the reconstruction 
of Aceh, did eventually develop its own gender policy in September 2006 and 
set up a Gender Working Group in recognition of the gendered impacts of the 
tsunami and in response to criticisms about its lack of attention to women. 
Relief 
Most reports observe that, as with all disasters, the tsunami had gender 
specific impacts. Perhaps most notably, in some parts of Aceh women 
accounted for over 75% of deaths (Oxfam, 2005). One of the immediate 
effects of this was that men had to take over domestic roles not familiar to 
them and other women had to shoulder more of the domestic work. A longer 
term gender impact of the disproportionate number of deaths of women was 
that remaining women were forced into marriages at younger ages, resulting 
in more pregnancies and fewer girls attending school, thereby depriving them 
of education and limiting their future options (Oxfam, 2005). The immediate 
practical needs of men and women differ in disaster situations. Several 
reports criticise that women's practical needs such as personal hygiene 
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requirements, nutrition for breastfeeding and so on, were not met in the early 
aftermath of the tsunami by either the Indonesian government or by INGOs 
(HRC, 2005; Umar et aI., 2006). The report by Umar et al (2006) was the 
result of a survey carried out in Aceh. Comprehensive information was 
collected from a variety of sources including reports, focus group discussions, 
observations and interviews with tsunami survivors. The criticisms contained 
in that and other reports are significant because, as discussed above, the 
gendered impacts of disasters have been well understood by relief and 
development organisations for some time. 
Pre-existing vulnerabilities contributed to the gender related impacts of the 
tsunami (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). Women in Aceh were already one of the 
most vulnerable groups in society. Due in large part to decades of civil 
conflict, they were affected by poverty, fear, loss of male family members, and 
many had been victims of abuse (HRC, 2005). It is widely recognised that pre-
existing vulnerabilities act as constraints in emergency situations making it 
harder for people to access assistance and assert their rights. For women in 
Aceh, this was further exacerbated by the prevailing attitude of the religious 
leaders that the tsunami was a punishment from God against women for their 
immoral behaviour (Umar et aI., 2006). This interpretation of the disaster 
gained popularity, resulting in the official implementation of Sharia law about 
six months after the tsunami. The strict enforcement of the religious law has 
resulted in additional restrictions being placed on women leading to their 
further marginalisation and exclusion from the reconstruction process. 
The temporary accommodation arrangements for people displaced from their 
homes have been heavily criticised for not meeting either women's practical 
needs nor their longer term, more strategic needs. Practically, the 
accommodation (which initially consisted of tents and later were barrack-like 
buildings) was not safe for women. They were out-numbered by men, there 
was a lack of safe and private washing facilities and there was inadequate 
lighting at night. Numerous reports point to these factors as contributing to an 
increase in violence against women, including sexual harassment (Umar et 
aI., 2006). As a result, women became further marginalised because they did 
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not feel safe and their psychological and emotional wellbeing was negatively 
impacted, hindering their ability to be productive. 
Reconstruction 
As a situation moves along the messy and seldom clear-cut progression from 
emergency relief to the reconstruction phase, gender concerns become less 
about immediate practical needs and more about longer term strategic needs. 
As discussed above however, failure to take account of practical needs from 
the outset can result in strategic needs being harder to meet. 
In respect of more strategic and longer term needs, camps were often 
geographically isolated, far from work opportunities and chances to participate 
in decision making processes (Eye on Aceh, 2006; HRC, 2005). Women were 
not consulted, and were seen as vulnerable victims rather than active 
participants (Umar et aI., 2006). Several reports say that women's 
participation was not taken seriously and that international organisations failed 
to ensure their active participation (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). In my own 
discussions with representatives of local Acehnese women's organisations in 
January 2007, the same concerns were expressed. In their experience, 
international organisations had gender policies but little was actually being 
done to implement them and women were not being given opportunities to 
participate. 
Most reports observe the lack of participation by women in the reconstruction 
process in Aceh. The reasons include: 
• INGOs seeing full consultation as taking too long (Eye on Aceh, 2006). 
• Women living in isolated barracks at distance from where decisions are 
being made (Eye on Aceh, 2006). 
• Women being seen as passive victims by INGOs rather than active 
participants (Eye on Aceh, 2006; Oxfam, 2005). 
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• Sharia law restricting women's ability to claim their human rights (HRC, 
2005). 
• Early marriages at young ages drawing girls out of school, depriving 
them of education and therefore better opportunities to participate 
(Oxfam, 2005). 
• A lack of women's representation generally in local government and 
village leadership structures (BRR, 2006; Eye on Aceh, 2006). 
• INGO workers had little or no knowledge of the local context (Telford & 
Cosgrave, 2006; UN, 2005a) and their organisational gender policies 
were inappropriate to the local context (Houghton, 2005). 
• A lack of gender disaggregated data and other analytical methods that 
prevented INGOs from identifying gender related issues (Houghton, 
2005; Oxfam, 2005). 
• A lack of respect by INGOs for existing standards such as Sphere 
(Telford & Cosgrave, 2006; UN, 2005b). 
• Economic assistance programmes that focussed primarily on men 
(Asia Foundation, 2006). Eye on Aceh (2006) reported that women did 
receive some livelihood assistance but that it was for activities such as 
baking and sewing which did not generate much income and risked 
having the effect of confining women to their pre-tsunami status. There 
was also a lack of opportunities for women to undertake training that 
might help improve their employment prospects in the future. 
The UN reports referred to above came out of workshops held in Medan and 
Jakarta to examine lessons learned. The workshops and subsequent reports 
provide important insights because they were timely (within the first year of 
the tsunami) and they involved organisations that participated in the response 
and therefore were in a good position to comment on problems and lessons 
learned. On the other hand, reports prepared by independent NGOs who 
were not themselves part of the response, such as Eye on Aceh, have value 
because they come from a more impartial perspective. 
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It is notable that most of the reports reviewed focus on women in their 
evaluation of the tsunami response in respect of gender issues. This probably 
reflects the reality that women were more marginalised in that particular 
context as is generally the case in disaster aftermaths, but perhaps also 
reflects the tendency observed in the literature to continue focussing on 
women rather than on gender. 
Summary 
I NGOs failed to effectively implement their gender policies and adhere to 
recognised standards in respect of gender in both the relief and reconstruction 
phases in Aceh post-tsunami. Women were not actively included in the 
reconstruction process and their numerous vulnerabilities due to prevailing 
physical, social and religious conditions were not fully appreciated by 
responding INGOs. 
Organisational Learning 
Given the TEC's criticism that the international humanitarian community has 
failed to learn important lessons, it is useful to understand how in fact 
organisations can and do learn. Many authors who write about how 
organisations learn lessons that translate into improved practice refer to 
'learning organisations'. James Taylor (1998, p. 1), Director of Community 
Development Resource Association in South Africa (CORA) defined a 
learning organisation as an "organisation which builds and improves its own 
practice by consciously and continually devising and developing the means to 
draw learning from its own (and others') experience." Taylor's definition is 
useful because it incorporates some key ingredients of effective learning that 
are widely recognised in the literature. It includes the idea of improvement: the 
purpose of learning is to get better at doing something. It talks about learning 
being a conscious thing, which implies that organisations have to actively 
learn and this involves an understanding of when and how learning occurs. 
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The definition also sees learning as a continuous process, not a one-off 
activity. And finally, it explicitly states that learning is drawn from experience, 
both an organisation's own and others'. This is important because there is not 
a lot of evidence in the literature to show that organisations draw on practice 
to learn lessons and inform policy, as will be discussed below. 
Improvement Through Learning 
Authors agree that learning is evidenced by improved practice (Birkland, 
2006; Pasteur, 2004; Taylor, 1998). Pasteur's (2004) review of the literature 
on organisational learning showed that learning by an organisation involves 
the transformation of knowledge into improved practice, not just a transfer of 
knowledge. Birkland (2006) wrote about policy change after catastrophic 
events, whether it occurs and to what extent. While he focussed on policy 
change at a state level rather than an NGO level, some of his observations 
and findings are relevant to the NGO sector. Birkland has developed a model 
of 'Event Related Policy Learning' (2006, p. 18). He notes that 'increased 
agenda attention' occurs after major events such as catastrophes, but that in 
itself does not necessarily lead to actual learning. Birkland suggests that 
'direct learning' occurs where policy is changed on the basis of what is 
learned from a disaster. But he notes that the literature on policy change 
warns against attributing change to one particular cause. He also discusses 
the difficulty in measuring learning or showing that it has actually occurred. 
Learning as a Continuous Process 
In reality, organisations cannot learn. It is the individuals that make up the 
organisations that learn (Taylor, 1998). Organisational learning is a 
continuous, cumulative process of improvement, not just a one-off thing that 
happens at the end of a given project that can be 'ticked off' as having been 
achieved (Hilhorst, 2002; Ramalingam, 2005). This raises issues of 
knowledge management within organisations. Ramalingam (2005) studied a 
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variety of organisational initiatives related to knowledge strategies to examine 
the links between policy and practice and cautions that in reality organisations 
face resource constraints, and the drive for continuous improvement should 
be done in a way that is, among other things, measurable, realistic and 
appropriate to the particular organisation. 
There is a tendency for development organisations to confine learning to the 
monitoring and evaluation phase of their work rather than constantly feeding 
back information to improve ongoing practice (Hovland, 2003). As discussed 
in the review of the literature on gender and development above, 
organisations are not giving sufficient attention to evaluating gender policies in 
the monitoring and evaluation phase in any event. The importance of 
continuous learning is consistent with the literature that requires gender 
policies to be adaptable to local contexts because adaptability involves 
ongoing learning as policies are being implemented, not waiting until the 
evaluation phase some time down the track. 
How Learning Occurs 
Taylor's (1998) definition of learning organisations suggests learning is a 
conscious and active process that requires an understanding by organisations 
of how they learn and an awareness that learning is drawn from experiences. 
The Overseas Development Institute (001) initiated a Bridging Research and 
Policy Project to examine the relationship between development research, 
policy and practice with a view to promoting evidence-based development 
policy. Hovland (2003) prepared a paper as part of the project that was an 
annotated bibliography of the literature on organisational learning as it relates 
to development organisations. She identified a gap in the literature regarding 
how institutions apply knowledge and learning. Rowan-Campbell (1999) also 
observed a lack of application by organisations of lessons learned. 
Power, Maury and Murray (2002) agree there is limited understanding about 
how organisations learn but they stress that organisations need to learn how 
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they learn in order to be effective at it. Hailey and James (2002), who 
conducted a study of South Asian NGOs, concluded organisational learning 
depends to a large extent on the attitude of the leader and the organisational 
culture they therefore create. They say too that informal processes alone are 
not enough; formal training and good systems are required for successful 
learning. Learning is something that requires organisations to work hard at. 
Learning and Policy Change 
Buchanan-Smith (2003, p. vi), another contributing author to the 001 Project, 
undertook a case study of the Sphere Project. She speaks of an 
"unprecedented window of opportunity" and observes that the humanitarian 
system is "most responsive to change under pressure, when the push factors 
are strong". A number of authors have written about how following that event, 
international humanitarian organisations engaged in a process of self-
reflection with a view to improving future performance. 11 Birkland also writes 
that policy change and learning occur more rapidly following a disaster. 
Buchanan-Smith concluded that a good relationship between researchers and 
policy makers, and a high level of inclusiveness were two of the main reasons 
why the development of Sphere Standards was successful in terms of the 
level of buy-in by NGOs after the Rwanda crisis. 
On the other hand, David Mosse (2004), a development anthropologist based 
at the University of London, considers that too much emphasis is placed on 
the relationship between research and policy and not enough attention is paid 
to the relationship between policy and practice. This is consistent with 
MacDonald's (2003) finding that there is a lack of evidence to show how 
evaluations are fed back in to policy design and Hovland's (2003) observation 
that there is a gap in the literature in this respect. Mosse comments that "rapid 
policy change which has little regard for the institutions and relationships 
involved in the practice of development is a worrying characteristic of aid 
11 See also Hilhorst (2002). 
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agencies today" (Mosse, 2004, p. 661). Mosse's concern is that NGOs are 
changing their policies faster than the life of the programme, which means 
they are operating in a reactive and perhaps ad hoc way. He worries such 
behaviour is more about preserving themselves rather than actually learning, 
consistent with Power et al (2002). Mosse's cautions are a counter to much of 
the literature on gender and development that calls for adaptability of policies 
based on experience on a continuous basis. 
Barriers to Learning 
Fowler (1997, p. 64) refers to NGOs as having a "limited capacity to learn, 
adapt and continuously improve the quality of what they do." Taylor (1998) 
asks why the same mistakes are made over and over again by organisations. 
In answer he suggests that there is often an imbalance between action and 
reflection within organisations and that there is a perception that getting it 
wrong amounts to failure and reflects badly on performance. Power et al 
(2002) point to a lack of feedback loops that allow for bottom-up learning and 
accountability. Often there are extensive evaluations done that result in 
reports that sit on a shelf somewhere rather than being fed back into learning 
systems. Hailey and James (2002) suggest other reasons why organisations 
struggle to learn, including: competition for funds between organisations and 
departmental rivalries within them; an unwillingness to apply limited funds to 
intangible things like learning; and an unwillingness by individuals to embrace 
new ideas and change their behaviour. Finally, rapid staff turnover that is 
characteristic of the humanitarian aid sector, results in organisations placing 
little emphasis on learning (Richardson, 2006). 
Summary 
Organisations improve their performance by actively learning lessons. Those 
lessons are drawn from the organisation's own, and others' experience. 
Learning is an ongoing process that requires structured systems in addition to 
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informal processes. A number of barriers to learning within organisations are 
identified above that provide some explanation as to why organisations 
continue to make the same mistakes. 
Conclusion 
A review of the literature shows the emergence of gender concerns in the 
development context and specifically in post-conflict/post-disaster situations. It 
is clear that the progression from a focus on the disadvantaged position of 
women to a focus on gender dynamics and power imbalances has not been 
smooth and the WID/GAD conflict is ongoing. A number of difficulties remain, 
particularly in respect of implementing gender policies. Reasons for these 
difficulties include: 
• Insufficient training of staff to implement policies. 
• The failure of policies to be relevant to local situations and a lack of 
understanding of the local context by those trying to implement 
them. 
• The urgency of the emergency resulting in less time and resources 
to focus on gender. 
Some authors point to GAD fatigue and a loss of momentum on gender 
concerns, which may also explain in part why gender considerations are 
easily sidelined in emergency responses. 
The evaluation of the international humanitarian response to the tsunami in 
Aceh appears consistent with the literature on gender and development and 
the difficulties identified by it. Evaluation reports reveal the international 
community fell short of its own standards in its response. Many reports 
concluded that major lessons have not been learned since the last big 
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international response in Rwanda following which the international community 
was forced to self reflect and find ways to improve its performance. 
Consequently, there have been renewed calls for regulation of the 
humanitarian community (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). Learning goes hand in 
hand with accountability and the literature records increasing calls for 
accountability of humanitarian organisations to the recipients of assistance 
(Buchanan-Smith, 2003; Eltahawy, 2006; Hilhorst, 2002), not only to their 
donors but to other stakeholders including beneficiaries. Where previously 
there had been a culture of unquestioning acceptance of humanitarian work, 
after the response in Rwanda, the international humanitarian community 
came under intense scrutiny. 
The review of the literature on organisational learning looks at how 
organisations learn lessons and incorporate that learning back into their 
policies and procedures to ensure ongoing, continuous improvement and it 
states that learning requires formal systems and leadership commitment and 
is an active and ongoing process. The best opportunities for learning lie in the 
wake of a major catastrophe, but organisations should be learning continually. 
There is debate between authors about the appropriateness and speed of 
policy change in response to what happens in practice. There is also a gap 
identified in the literature concerning how organisations learn from evaluations 
and subsequently apply such lessons. 
The literature reviewed has highlighted the issues integral to this research. It 
demonstrates the importance of having regard to gender issues as part of a 
disaster response, and through the reports on Aceh, shows what can happen 
when insufficient attention is paid to gender issues in a given context. 
Organisational learning is critical given the hefty criticisms and observations 
that INGOs are not learning and are repeating their mistakes. This research 
picks up on these issues and looks at how NZ NGOs have engaged in a 
process of learning lessons, against the backdrop of gender issues in the 
post-tsunami response in Aceh. The next chapter provides some further 
contextual information on Aceh and the impact of the tsunami there to 
describe the environment in which NZ NGOs were working. 
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Chapter Three 
Aceh 
Introduction 
Wherever disasters hit there are a range of local, context-specific realities that 
will necessarily determine the extent of the disaster but also impact on the 
subsequent relief and reconstruction activities. This chapter provides some 
background information about Aceh and the tsunami. It describes some of the 
context-specific realities that made Aceh the worst tsunami-affected region 
and that posed challenges to INGOs that responded to the disaster. 
The chapter begins with a brief account of my own experience in Aceh that 
stimulated my interest in the topic for this thesis. I then provide some general 
information about the tsunami and particularly its impact in Aceh. Next, I 
discuss three main context-specific factors that I suggest posed significant 
challenges to INGOs carrying out humanitarian relief and reconstruction work: 
the sheer scale of the disaster; the pre-existing civil conflict; and the strict 
implementation of Sharia law. Those factors necessarily involve gender 
issues and affected the ability of INGOs to operate in a gender sensitive way. 
They are context specific factors that should have been taken into account by 
organisations when trying to implement gender policies as part of relief and 
reconstruction work. The chapter ends with a discussion on the ongoing 
vulnerability of women in Aceh and the work of local women's organisations. 
Personal Experience 
In addition to official reports and newspaper articles, much of this background 
information comes from my own observations and casual conversations from 
a visit to Aceh between December 2006 and February 2007. I went to Aceh to 
do volunteer community development work through an NZ-based NGO that 
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had partnered with a local organisation. Living and working in a village about 
30 kilometres from the provincial capital of Banda Aceh, I experienced first 
hand some of the challenges of working in that particular context. Those 
challenges included trying to work in a gender sensitive and gender inclusive 
way. My observations were that women were noticeably less visible in 
community life. Leisure activities, such as volleyball and socialising at the 
local coffee shop, for example, were geared towards men. It was difficult to 
engage with women directly, partly because of their apparent lack of 
presence, but it was also difficult to arrange times to meet with them because 
of their heavy domestic responsibilities. My own lack of knowledge of the local 
language and the short-term nature of my visit meant I relied heavily on the 
local staff to facilitate and translate. The local staff members were 
predominantly male, which I felt created an additional barrier to working with 
the local women. I became interested in gender issues in the Aceh post-
tsunami reconstruction context and how NGOs were dealing with those 
issues. 
During my visit, I was privileged to have the opportunity to speak with a 
number of Acehnese people about their experiences of the conflict and the 
tsunami. I met with representatives of some local women's organisations in 
Banda Aceh who spoke with me about their work. I talked with women in 
surrounding villages about their experiences when the waves hit and of the 
years they spent as victims in a violent conflict. Some of their comments and 
stories have been included in discussion of the wider issues below. I have 
paraphrased what they said and kept them anonymous. Mostly we 
communicated through interpreters or in broken English, so I cannot 
guarantee 100% accuracy. I recognise that that while this thesis is concerned 
with gender issues, the information I personally gleaned focuses mainly on 
the experiences of women. I witnessed an interview with one male village 
headman who was an ex-freedom fighter, but for the most part the 
conversations I participated in about people's personal experiences were with 
women. This should be kept in mind when considering my analysis. 
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The Tsunami 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami on 26 December 2004 killed 275,000 people in 
fourteen countries and directly affected two million people.12 The map below 
shows the areas affected by the tsunami and the location of the earthquake 
that triggered it. 
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Nearly 90% of the victims lived in Aceh or Sri Lanka (Le Billon & 
Waizenegger, 2007). In all areas affected by the tsunami , 80% of those killed 
were women (Umar et aI. , 2006). There are two main reasons for the high 
proportion of female deaths: sex and gender. In respect of sex, men are 
physically stronger and therefore more able to hold on to fixed structures to 
resist being swept away. In respect of gender, men are more likely to be able 
12 Source: http://www.tsunami-evaluation .org . 
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to swim, tend not to have childcare responsibilities, and wear less restrictive 
clothing (Cosgrave, 2007). 
Aceh is a semi-autonomous region on the northern most tip of the Indonesian 
island of Sumatra. Its location, right by the epicentre of the earthquake, made 
it the worst tsunami-affected area in the Indian Ocean (Telford & Cosgrave, 
2006). The under-sea earthquake was centred 150 km off the coast of Aceh 
and measured 9.0 on the Richter scale. It occurred at 7:50 am local time and 
caused extensive damage. The first of two or three resulting waves,13 up to 
twenty metres in height, hit Aceh about forty five minutes later (BRR, 2005). 
Over 165,000 people were killed in Aceh (BRR, 2005), which was 
approximately 4% of the population and accounts for well over half the overall 
death toll world wide from the tsunami. A further 500,000 people were 
displaced from their homes (BRR, 2005). Banda Aceh , the provincial capital 
situated on the coast, suffered extensive damage to buildings and lost 20% of 
all local government staff. 14 The Indonesian military, which had a strong 
presence in Aceh , also suffered heavy losses (Cosgrave, 2007). 
Two thirds of Aceh 's population of 4.2 million were affected in some way by 
the tsunami (Le Billon & Waizenegger, 2007). Apart from the heavy death toll , 
some 800 kilometres of coastline was destroyed, including ports and 
harbours, fish farms and mangroves. High levels of soil salinity and debris 
rendered large areas of land useless for farming . Some land was permanently 
lost to the sea. Major roads , bridges and entire villages were wiped out, 
leaving many areas isolated . Communications infrastructure was destroyed, 
which meant it took some time for details to emerge of the extent of the 
devastation. 600,000 people in Aceh lost their livelihoods.15 
13 I spoke with the headman of a village that was all but destroyed by the tsunami . He spoke 
of three separate waves. Others speak of just two waves. 
14 Source: http://www.e-aceh-nias.orq . 
15 See http://www.tsunami-evaluation.orq . 
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Proximity was only one of the reasons for the severe impact of the tsunami on 
Aceh. As mentioned above, there were other factors that compounded the 
disaster including three main factors particular to Aceh that posed context-
specific challenges to relief and reconstruction efforts by INGOs and 
ultimately to their ability to operate in a gender sensitive way or effectively 
implement their gender policies. They are: the sheer scale of disaster and 
consequent level of international response; the pre-existing civil conflict; and 
the religious environment. 
Scale of Disaster and Influx of NGOs 
The scale of the disaster in Aceh led to an unprecedented international 
response in terms of the mobilisation of funds and resources (Telford & 
Cosgrave, 2006). Over US$14 billion was raised internationally. That amounts 
to an average of US$7,000 per affected person. 16 According to Schulze 
(2005), in Aceh alone over 3000 Indonesian NGOs and INGOs were 
registered as working immediately post-tsunami. Coordination was a major 
challenge because of the sheer number of actors involved. In addition, Aceh's 
semi-autonomous status led to some confusion in the initial post-disaster 
period about where authority lay for the coordination of emergency response. 
The level of international funding and the number of NGOs in the area 
seeking to disburse those funds quickly to satisfy donors led to a significant 
level of competition between organisations, which resulted in duplication and 
waste (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006).17 
During a visit I made to an Indonesian NGO in Banda Aceh, one of their 
international partners was there running a capacity building session on 
beneficiary accountability. They identified the enormous pressure to spend 
money quickly in such an environment as one of the reasons why it was so 
difficult to be accountable to beneficiaries. In this context, the challenge for 
NGOs to operate in a gender sensitive way was only one of many. The 
16 Source: ~~~~~~~~~~~ 
17 Comments to this effect were also made by several INGO workers I spoke with in Aceh. 
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evidence suggests that the level of urgency in delivering aid and relief amidst 
the chaos and devastation resulted in gender concerns being sidelined in the 
early stages of disaster response (Umar et aI., 2006). The process of 
engaging women through consultation was seen by many organisations as 
taking too long (Eye on Aceh, 2006). 
The combination of the extent of the disaster and the large number of actors 
competing to deliver aid made it difficult for INGOs to pay proper attention to 
gender issues and, as has been suggested above, resulted in a lack of 
accountability to beneficiaries. 
Aceh's Conflict 
Apart from its proximity, another reason Aceh was so badly impacted by the 
tsunami was that it had already experienced thirty years of violent conflict with 
GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), the Free Aceh Movement fighting against the 
Indonesian army (TNI) for independence. The effect of the conflict was two-
fold. First, it meant that there were pre-existing vulnerabilities that 
exacerbated the tsunami's impact. Second, it made subsequent relief efforts 
that much more complex because of the existing tensions and the underlying 
complex needs of a society emerging from years of conflict. These are 
discussed in more detail below, after a brief overview of the history of the 
conflict. 
History of Conflict 
Conflict in Aceh goes back beyond the last thirty years. In 1873 the Dutch 
invaded the region and tried to conquer it. Aceh resisted and was embroiled in 
warfare for three decades. The Acehnese people do not accept the Dutch 
ever fully gained control. Even after the Dutch left, throughout the mid-1900s 
there were several rebellions because Aceh was dissatisfied with the way it 
was being treated by the Indonesian government. The Acehnese people 
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considered their rich natural resources were being exploited but they were 
seeing little of the revenue generated. Attempts to negotiate solutions often 
failed because people in Aceh felt the central government continuously did not 
uphold its side of any bargains made. 18 
The most recent conflict began in 1976 when GAM was formed in a renewed 
attempt to attain independence. Sometimes it was suppressed by military 
action of the Indonesian government. At other times negotiations between the 
two sides, occasionally with third parties involved, went some way to help 
ease tensions. In 2001, the central government passed a Special Autonomy 
Law that gave Aceh a certain amount of self-rule. This did not resolve the 
conflict however and violent clashes continued. Another peace process, 
supported internationally, broke down in 2003, and martial law was declared. 
At that point, the few INGOs that were working in Aceh were forced out. 
A ceasefire was declared within days of the tsunami in 2004 as both sides 
turned their attention to relief efforts. Recognising an opportunity, efforts to 
secure a new peace deal were stepped up and so far have been successful. 
The enormous influx of international organisations and media is credited to 
some extent with preventing a return to conflict. The latest peace agreement 
was signed on 15 August 2005, some eight months after the tsunami, and so 
far, although there have been minor clashes (Burke & Afnan, 2005), it has 
held. However, a recent report by the International Crisis Group (2007) warns 
of a return to conflict, with many issues still unresolved and dissatisfaction 
among the Acehnese population with their newly elected officials. 
Many Acehnese people see the tsunami as being responsible for ending the 
thirty-year conflict. Most of the people I spoke with held this view and referred 
to the tsunami as being "a gift from God" for that reason. 19 Nevertheless, 
there is evidence to suggest a peace process was well on its way before the 
tsunami hit (Braud & Grevi, 2005). Le Billon and Waizenegger (2007) though, 
18 For more information on the history of conflict in Aceh see: Reid (2006) and Barber (2000). 
19 The religious explanation for the tsunami is widespread. One group of people I spoke with 
talked about three separate waves, the last one being clear fresh water, not salt water. The 
people interpreted this as being a "cleansing wave" sent by Allah. 
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who have compared Sri Lanka to Aceh in terms of the impact of the tsunami 
on the respective cont/icts, say that without the tsunami sustainable peace 
would have been significantly less likely. 
Pre-existing Vulnerabilities 
As a result of the long history of violence and unrest, Aceh was vulnerable on 
numerous fronts. The infrastructure was already weakened, damaged and in 
a state of disrepair. Few existing structures were able to withstand the force of 
the waves. The local government was also weak, corruption levels were high 
and there was a lack of public confidence in the government. The economy 
had suffered and people were generally poor. In addition, there were already 
internally displaced persons (lOPs) as a result of the conflict. As at June 2003, 
an estimated 48,262 people had been displaced from their homes (Burke & 
Afnan, 2005). However, a World Bank Village Survey conducted three years 
later in 2006 recorded that 103,453 households had been displaced by the 
conflict.2o Additionally, there were victims of violence. Numerous reports have 
documented the abuses suffered by men and women at the hands of 
combatants and government soldiers (Good, DelVecchio Good, Grayman, & 
Lakoma, 2006). One young woman I talked to described how TNI soldiers 
forced their way into her house at night because they suspected male 
members of her family were GAM fighters. They used their weapons to hit 
her brother in the head, causing it to bleed. They pulled open the tops of her 
and her sisters' clothing. Many reports show that women were the victims of 
gender-based violence and there are allegations the TNI used the rape of 
women as a weapon of war (Eye on Aceh, 2004; UNFPA, 2005). One way the 
tsunami exacerbated the impact of those abuses is that, according to local 
police, all documentation recording cases of violence against women were 
destroyed by the tsunami (UNFPA, 2005), thereby putting access to justice for 
the crimes committed against them further out of reach. 
20 This information was obtained at a presentation I attended at the World Bank office in 
Banda Aceh. on 26 January 2007. 
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Acehnese society was fractured and people were already traumatised and 
vulnerable. During the conflict men were absent from their homes for years at 
a time while they fought government forces. I listened to one man describe 
how he spent seven years in the hills, away from his family. This made 
women more vulnerable and placed additional pressure on them. They had to 
take on men's traditional roles, undertake employment outside the home and 
support their families. The conflict was responsible for the deaths of some 
15,000 people (BRR, 2005), mostly men. This resulted in numerous female-
headed households. As it happened, the tsunami killed more women than 
men, thereby restoring gender balance in terms of overall numbers.21 But it 
also caused another change in gender roles as men suddenly found 
themselves raising children without wives and being responsible for totally 
unfamiliar domestic duties. 
Impact of Conflict on Relief Efforts 
The history of conflict not only compounded the impact of the tsunami but also 
hampered to some extent subsequent relief efforts. One reason was that for 
some years Aceh had been all but closed off to outsiders, including NGOs. 
This meant that NGOs had little or no context-specific knowledge and 
experience of the area. Their understanding of pre-existing social conditions, 
conflict dynamics and gender relations was limited or non-existent. 
Conflict, or the threat of it, placed some restrictions on INGOs in carrying out 
relief and reconstruction work. There were reports that due to some outbreaks 
of fighting INGOs were prevented from accessing some areas (Burke & 
Afnan, 2005). There was also a risk of pre-existing tensions being 
exacerbated by perceived unequal distribution of aid and resources. There is 
some evidence to show that conflict lOPs were not receiving the same 
benefits as tsunami lOPs and were being left behind in relief efforts.22 
21 Data obtained during a visit to the UNORC Office in Banda Aceh in January 2007. 
22 World Bank presentation. See footnote 20 above. 
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On another level, the transition from conflict to peace meant that I NGOs were 
simultaneously engaged in disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction 
activities, or at least were carrying out relief in a post-conflict environment, 
which presents additional challenges that complicated the aid relief and 
reconstruction efforts (HRC, 2005). INGOs were dealing with both conflict and 
tsunami victims. In effect, the conflict was responsible for an additional layer 
of complex issues to be negotiated as INGOs responded to the tsunami. An 
additional layer of dynamics was operating that INGOs needed to be aware of 
to be effective. For example, there was a whole generation of young men, ex-
combatants who were suddenly unoccupied, who needed to be reintegrated 
into society and the workforce. It was observed by Burke and Afnan (2005) in 
their study of organisations working in the post conflict environment in Aceh, 
that the most effective responses were those where the organisations 
adapted their activities to the conflict context. But they found that most 
organisations had not done that. 
Sharia Law 
Another factor that adds to the complexity for INGOs of working in Aceh is its 
political/religious status. As discussed above, INGOs were operating in an 
insecure political environment. But closely related to that is the rule of Sharia 
law in the region. Aceh has been strongly Islamic for hundreds of years and 
Islam is central to Acehnese identity (International Crisis Group, 2006). As 
part of Aceh's special status as a semi-autonomous region, in 2001 the 
central government gave permission for Aceh to partially implement Sharia. In 
2003 it was formally introduced and Sharia courts were opened. Since then it 
has become more strictly enforced over time, with special Sharia police being 
established about a year before the tsunami. 
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Sharia law is strictly implemented and it reinforces male domination and 
power structures.23 The way Sharia is enforced in Aceh discriminates against 
women and imposes restrictions on them that can make it difficult for INGOs 
to freely operate in accordance with their gender policies. INGOs are working 
against religious and cultural norms because there are rules about who 
women can interact with and when. Those existing norms also mean women 
are not well represented in leadership positions and are generally not part of 
decision-making processes (Eye on Aceh, 2006; HRC, 2005). This makes it 
more difficult for INGOs to seek out and consult with women in accordance 
with their policies. 
The implementation of Sharia has prevented women being able to claim their 
rights in respect of land.24 It prevents women from being able to freely report 
crimes committed against them, especially sex crimes, because of the 
negative inferences drawn about their own role and moral behaviour, and the 
prevailing male domination means often little is done about any reports that 
are made. Women I spoke to told me that Sharia itself is not discriminatory 
against women, but the way it is being implemented by those in power is. 
"Syari'a upholds equality for women. It's the implementation that's at fault.,,25 
Following the tsunami, the interpretation that prevailed among religious 
leaders was that the tsunami was sent by God as punishment for the sins of 
the women of Aceh (Meo, 2005; Umar et aI., 2006). This provided an excuse 
for implementing Sharia even more strictly. The women I met were all of the 
view the tsunami had been sent by God, not as punishment, but rather a gift 
from God to end the years of conflict and suffering. Several young village 
women told me that life is better for them since the tsunami. They had 
suffered abuse during the conflict and their personal security and freedom of 
movement was restricted by curfews. They now have more freedom of 
movement and access to material possessions not previously available to 
23 According to the leader of a local women's NGO in Banda Aceh that I spoke with in 
February 2007. 
24 According to a representative of another local women's NGO in Banda Aceh that I spoke 
with in February 2007. 
25 Rosmawardani (an Aceh-born law graduate) quoted in: Anonymous (2006, p. 16). 
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them. However, other evidence suggests that since the tsunami, the 
vulnerability of Acehnese women has in fact increased and this is discussed 
below. 
The strict interpretation and implementation of Sharia law impacted on the 
ability of INGOs to implement their gender policies because it created 
additional barriers to organisations seeking to include women. The overall 
erosion of the status of women by Sharia law required special consideration 
by INGOs if they wanted to address gender issues meaningfully in post-
tsunami Aceh. 
Women's Ongoing Vulnerability and the Work of Local Organisations 
In discussions with representatives of local women's organisations I became 
aware of the general view that Acehnese women had been marginalised in 
the reconstruction process. I was told that women were rarely involved in 
decision-making and that although INGOs had gender policies they were not 
doing enough to actively implement them. Women were seldom being given 
the opportunity to be directly and actively involved. 
Apart from being marginalised by INGOs in the reconstruction process, 
women are marginalised as a result of other factors too. For example, they 
continue to be victims of violence even though the conflict has ceased. Some 
25,000 people were still living in temporary accommodation at the end of 2006 
(Anonymous, 2006, 13-19 December). The accommodation is sub-standard, 
which particularly impacts on personal security for women. A report by the 
Indonesian National Commission on Violence Against Women (Samsidar, 
2006) found that there are persistent problems with sexual harassment and 
assaults on women in barracks. Further, the cramped and difficult living 
conditions, on top of the other stresses of being displaced and dispossessed, 
have contributed to an increase in the level of domestic violence, and forced 
marriages have become common. The series of events that have occurred in 
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Aceh - conflict, tsunami, Sharia - have eroded the status of women over time, 
making them increasingly marginalised and vulnerable. 
Local women's NGOs I visited while in Aceh had been active in the 
emergency phase following the tsunami. Although one in particular had itself 
suffered heavy losses of personnel and premises in the tsunami, it helped 
with logistical distribution, hygiene care for women, and nutrition for pregnant 
women in the early days. Since then it has been focusing on women's 
empowerment, including working with victims of domestic violence and 
providing micro-finance to women. It works with both tsunami and conflict 
victims but recognises that the needs of those two groups are different and 
require different responses. It conducts research to find out what the actual 
issues are for women and respond accordingly. A representative of the 
organisation suggested to me that neither the Indonesian government nor 
INGOS were doing that effectively. 
Another local organisation representative suggested the three biggest 
problems facing women in Aceh are: trauma from the conflict years; the 
implementation of Sharia; and the patriarchal society. In her view, Aceh is not 
yet in a post-conflict phase and will not be until proper rehabilitation and 
reintegration has occurred. There are government plans to give co nflict-
related compensation to women but so far compensation has only gone to 
men. 
Both organisations had at various times partnered with international agencies 
such as UNFPA and UNIFEM. 26 But generally, they felt that local 
organisations had been bypassed by INGOs who did not make use of their 
local knowledge and experience. The TEC also found this to be the case 
(Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). One organisation in particular had also 
experienced opposition to its activities from the local government and religious 
fundamentalist groups. 
26 The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and The United Nations Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM). 
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Conclusion 
While the Indian Ocean tsunami was not the worst disaster the world has 
seen in terms of number of deaths, it was the largest in terms of the 
international response and the funds and resources mobilised. Aceh was 
undoubtedly the worst affected area. This chapter has explained how three 
factors in particular have added to Aceh's vulnerability and created additional 
challenges to organisations working to provide relief and reconstruction in that 
environment. These are: the scale of the disaster there and the subsequent 
influx of organisations; the pre-existing and long running conflict; and the 
implementation of Sharia law. These three characteristics culminated to leave 
the women of Aceh especially vulnerable during and after the 2004 Tsunami. 
Consideration and awareness of these factors requires context-specific 
approaches by INGOs working there. They are factors that impact on gender 
considerations and as such should have informed the implementation of 
gender policies in post-tsunami Aceh. And yet, as many of the reports show, 
INGOs failed to acknowledge the impact these factors had on women and 
therefore failed to put in place policies and practices that would address these 
specific aspects appropriately. Further, they did not make use of local NGOs 
who had knowledge and experience that INGOs could have benefited from. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
This chapter briefly describes the methodology used for this research. It 
outlines sources of information, explains how and why I selected research 
participants and identifies the techniques used to analyse the data collected. 
There is a short section on the ethical requirements relating to the 
identification of participants. The chapter concludes with an acknowledgement 
of the limitations of the research. 
Qualitative Research Methodology 
The purpose of this case study is threefold: to reveal and analyse the gender-
related experiences of individuals from NZ-based NGOs who were in Aceh in 
the aftermath of the tsunami; to investigate how their sending organisations 
have responded to those experiences to ensure lessons are learned to 
improve future practice; and to identify barriers to learning within 
organisations. I chose to use qualitative research techniques, drawing on both 
primary and secondary sources of data. 
Primary Sources 
To enable exploration of the individual experiences and organisational 
responses I conducted semi-structured interviews with staff of NZ NGOS.27 
This method of inquiry allowed issues to emerge over the course of the 
research rather than being strictly pre-determined (Creswell, 2007). It has also 
enabled the voices of the participants, and their own interpretations of what 
they experienced, to be presented. Thus, the next chapter relies primarily on 
27 See Appendix One for the Interview Guide. 
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the participants' own words. However, I acknowledge that as researcher, my 
own background and experiences, particularly in Aceh, will to some extent 
have influenced the research process and my interpretation of the findings. 
To analyse the data I relied on techniques typical of qualitative research 
identified by Creswell (2007). I looked for patterns and themes across the 
interviews and compared and contrasted participants' responses. This 
involved the use of techniques such as highlighting, tabbing, cross-
referencing and drawing charts. 
Secondary Sources 
I also made use of secondary sources of information. These include various 
documents provided by the participating organisations, and a variety of other 
literature including local Acehnese newspapers, international journals and 
reports (see References). Other secondary sources of information include my 
own personal observations in Aceh from early December 2006 to mid-
February 2007, as well as some informal discussions I had with people there. 
I note these as secondary sources because although they are my first-hand 
observations they are not the experiences of the selected participants. 
Research Participants 
To answer the first research question about the gender-related challenges 
and experiences of working in Aceh, I spoke directly with people who had 
spent time there as part of their organisation's tsunami response. To answer 
the second research question about how organisations have responded to the 
challenges faced and sought to learn lessons, I spoke with representatives of 
those NGOs best in a position to comment. As shown below, in many cases 
the people interviewed for those two research questions were one and the 
same. All participants responded to questions about organisational learning. 
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To select participants, I obtained a list of seventeen NZ-based NGOs that 
were involved in the tsunami response from the Council of International 
Development (CID), the Wellington based umbrella organisation for New 
Zealand non-governmental development organisations. That list is presented 
in column one of Figure 2 below. I contacted the NGOs directly to find out 
whether they had sent staff to Aceh and this information is recorded in column 
two. Column three identifies the six agencies that participated in this research. 
Figure 2: Responding NGOs 28 
NGOs Involved in Organisations known to Participants in this 
Tsunami Response have sent workers to research 
Aceh 
ADRANZ ~ ~ 
BanzAid 
Caritas Aotearoa New ~ ~ 
Zealand 
Christian Blind Mission 
CWS 
Habitat for Humanity 
Medical Aid Abroad 
Oxfam NZ ~ ~ 
RedR 
Salvation Army (~) (~ - Member of the NZ 
Salvation Army recruited 
by IHQ for work in Aceh) 
Save the Children ~ 
Soroptimists 
Surf Aid ~ 
Tear Fund 
UNICEF NZ ~ ~ 
World Vision ~ Not formal participants, 
but provided some written 
material 
YMCA 
28 Not all organisations responded to my enquiries, so Figure 2 only presents information I 
know to be correct. There may be some omissions through lack of information. Of the 
organisations that sent staff to Aceh but have not participated in this research, two did not 
respond to my enquiries. The third was omitted in the initial selection process because the 
only staff member to go Aceh was the organisation's director, who briefly visited in a 
monitoring role only. Early on, I had not intended to include those that went in a monitoring 
capacity. When the subsequent decision was made to include them due to the otherwise 
small sample size, unfortunately that organisation was omitted by oversight, which is 
regretted. 
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Figure 3 below provides some more detailed information about participants. 
Column one identifies the ten individuals and shows the organisation each 
worked for. Column two records each participant's role in that organisation. 
Column three shows when each person was in Aceh, and column four 
describes the purpose of their visit. 
Figure 3 also includes two participants from NZAID, New Zealand's official 
government aid agency. Recognising the level of co-operation and information 
sharing that occurs between NZAID and the non-governmental sector, I 
wanted to obtain NZAID perspectives on some of the issues raised by this 
research. 
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Figure 3: Research Participants 
Participant Role in In Aceh Purpose of Visit 
Organisation 
ADRA 
• Robert Patton Emergency Late Conduct initial needs 
Programme December assessment and set-up 
Manager 2004 for up for ongoing response 
(ADRA Asia, to 3 weeks 
contracted to 
ADRA NZ) 
• Alan Fletcher International Early Support role 
Programme January 
Manager 2005 for 10 
days 
Caritas 
• Tim Chiswell Humanitarian Early Help plan 
Programme February organisational 
Manager 2005 for 3 response 
weeks 
Oxfam 
• Person A Staff member March 2006 Monitoring and 
for 10 days evaluation 
• Renzo Benfatto Current (Briefly in N/A 
Humanitarian 2006 with 
Programme Child Fund) 
Manager 
Salvation Army 
• Martyn Smith N/A April- Recruited as an 
August engineer but ended up 
2005 in consultant role 
UNICEF 
• Dennis McKinlay Executive January Facilitate a journalist's 
Director 2005 for a visit 
week 
• Philippa Day Corporate December Facilitate a journalist's 
Marketing 2005 for 4 visit 
Manager days 
NZAID 
• Don Clarke Director of N/A N/A 
Global 
Programmes 
• Mike Bird (went Development (Late March N/A 
to Aceh with Programme 2005 for 
Oxfam GB) Manager for one month 
Civil Society with Oxfam 
Great 
Britain) 
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Although Martyn Smith was recruited through the international headquarters 
of the Salvation Army (IHQ) rather than sent directly by the New Zealand 
Salvation Army (NZSA), I have included him because of the reasonable length 
of time he spent in Aceh. It was not possible to interview IHQ and not relevant 
to interview the NZSA. Therefore, his personal experiences are presented but 
there is no information available about the response of the sending 
organisation in terms of lessons learned. 
In the case of Caritas, the person who went to Aceh, Tim Chiswell, was also 
the person best placed to comment on organisational response given his role 
at the time of Humanitarian Programmes Manager. The same applies for the 
International Programme Manager of ADRA, Alan Fletcher, and the Executive 
Director of UNICEF, Dennis McKinlay. 
Conversely, the current Humanitarian Programme Manager at Oxfam, Benzo 
Benfatto, went to Aceh after the tsunami when he worked for an NGO not 
based in New Zealand. Similarly, Mike Bird, who I interviewed for his 
perspectives as an NZAID staff member, spent some time in Aceh with Oxfam 
Great Britain. Their experiences of Aceh have nevertheless been included in 
the fol/owing chapter because they have relevant insights into what it was like 
to work in that context. 
It is worth noting briefly here that eight of the ten participants are male, 
although this fact is not considered in any further depth as part of this 
research. 
Ethics Approval 
Ethics approval for this research was required by the Victoria University Ethics 
Committee and obtained on 28 August 2007. All participants signed consent 
forms. Consent was also obtained from the head of each participating 
organisation for the NGO to be identified. All individual participants, except 
one, consented to being personally identified and having their comments 
attributed to them. The person who did not wish to be identified by name did 
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consent to be connected with her NGO and is referred to as Person A. Person 
A's role has been referred to generically as "staff member" to further protect 
anonymity. 
Limitations of Research 
My research has been affected to some extent by the following three 
limitations: time constraints; the level of staff turnover in NGOs; and small 
sample size due to the traditional fund raising nature of NZ NGOs. 
Time 
In keeping with the emergent nature of qualitative research as discussed 
above, the semi-structured interviews with participants often led to 
suggestions of other sources of information. The limited time available to 
complete this thesis meant it was not possible to follow up all of these 
suggestions. 
Staff Turnover 
There has been a noticeable level of staff turnover in NZ-based NGOs since 
the tsunami. In several cases, those who went to Aceh with a particular 
organisation have moved on to other jobs. That made it difficult to track 
people down. Similarly, in some cases those in positions ideal for commenting 
on organisational response, such as humanitarian programme managers, had 
not been in the role at the time of the tsunami. Knowledge was therefore 
limited at times, and it has made the potential pool of participants smaller. The 
problem of staff turnover however does affect my findings and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Sample Size 
NZ NGOs are traditionally funding organisations. There are indications this 
may slowly be changing as organisations increase their capacity to respond to 
humanitarian emergencies. 29 Certainly, the scale of the tsunami resulted in 
many NGOs working outside their usual areas of practice. But even so, few 
sent staff to Aceh and some of those only went briefly in a monitoring and 
evaluation role rather than as fieldworkers or implementers of programmes. 
The sample size for this research is therefore small. The research presents 
the experiences and views of a few individuals. The findings in the next 
chapter are therefore specific to the participant organisations rather than 
representative of NZ NGOs and their workers. The research seeks to 
investigate some of the issues specific to that time and place, Le. post-
tsunami Aceh, and does not purport to apply on a wider scale. 
Summary 
This chapter briefly discussed the qualitative nature of this study and 
consequent methodology used to carry it out, including the techniques 
employed to analyse the data collected. It identified the various sources from 
which information has been drawn. It also provided some background 
information about participants that will help put their experiences in Aceh, as 
discussed in the following chapter, in some context. 
29 See Chapter Five for further information about this. 
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Chapter Five 
Findings 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the research. It begins by restating the 
main research questions and identifying relevant sub-questions, then 
explaining the overall importance of the research questions. The chapter is 
then divided into three parts as per the research questions. Participants' 
comments are grouped and presented according to topic. The perspectives of 
two NZAID staff are included in relation to various issues as they come up. It 
should be noted that the comments are the personal views of the respondents 
and do not represent an official NZAID response. 
The findings in this chapter come primarily from semi-structured interviews 
conducted with the ten participants. For the most part I have quoted the 
participants directly. In some cases, where comments are lengthy, I have 
paraphrased them, trying to remain as true as possible to their original 
wording. I have also drawn on secondary sources such as documents 
referred to or provided to me directly by participants. 
Research Questions 
This research asks three main questions: 
1. What were the challenges and experiences faced by NZ NGO 
workers in implementation of their gender policies and 
procedures while engaging in relief and reconstruction activities 
in Aceh? 
This can be broken down into two questions: 
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a) What were the challenges and experiences? 
b) How did these impact on the implementation of gender 
policies? 
2. How have the sending NGOs responded to those challenges 
and experiences to ensure that lessons have been learned? 
I have broken down this question into three sub-questions as 
follows: 
a) How did sending organisations capture the particular 
experiences of their own staff who went to Aceh? 
b) How have organisations sought to learn lessons from 
their overall tsunami response in Aceh? 
c) What specific lessons have been learned about gender? 
3. What, if any, obstacles to learning exist within those NGOs? 
These questions are important because given the damning reports on the 
international response and its handling of gender issues in Aceh, 
understanding the particular challenges faced there will hopefully contribute to 
an appreciation of the need for gender policies that are responsive to local 
realities. Further, there is increasing demand for NGOs to be accountable and 
this requires that they commit themselves to learning lessons from their 
practical experiences. Understanding the barriers to learning that may exist 
within NZ NGOs is vital to knowing what may be done to address them and so 
ensure better learning and thereby better outcomes. 
Gender Related Challenges and Experiences 
Question: What were the challenges and experiences faced by 
NZ NGO workers in implementation of their gender 
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policies and procedures while engaging in relief and 
reconstruction activities in Aceh? 
This section sets out the participants' post-tsunami experiences in Aceh as 
they relate to gender issues and shows how the various context-specific 
challenges impacted their ability to implement gender policies. Respondents' 
comments30 are presented under eight main subject headings: 
1. Scale of the Disaster 
2. The Gendered Impacts of the Tsunami 
3. Moving from Emergency Response to Reconstruction 
4. Media Coverage and Funding 
5. Consultation with Women 
6. Sharia Law 
7. The Impact of the Military and Conflict 
8. Gender Policies 
Scale of the Disaster 
Participants emphatically identified the sheer magnitude of the disaster as 
being the most challenging aspect of their disaster response activities. 
Organisations found themselves overwhelmed and unprepared for the scale 
and this had flow on effects for their operations. 
I mean the scale of the disaster, I don't think anyone had done before 
... It caught everyone off guard, the scale of it, the sheer scale of it. 
Fletcher 
The scale and magnitude was definitely beyond anything I'd seen ... I 
mean you plan for disasters but no one had ever planned for anything 
of that magnitude. 
Patton 
30 All interviews were conducted between September and December 2007. 
52 
The scope of that was beyond anything anyone had ever struck before. 
It certainly tested our resources. 
McKinlay 
• Lack of Resources 
The extent of the destruction put pressure on the ability of organisations to 
provide enough resources to meet victims' needs. Also, it meant very little 
existed by way of basic services and infrastructure to get people and supplies 
where they were needed. 
We were absolutely swamped and overwhelmed by the scale of it and 
they were pulling resources from anywhere they could get them and 
they were still struggling to meet the needs. 
Fletcher 
Access was extremely difficult ... Communications were non-existent ... 
There was absolutely nothing and it was probably a month before we 
got even some remotely useful communications in there ... There were 
no resources, no means of getting them in there ... there was just 
nothing there ... Because of the huge magnitude of it and the limited 
resources we had it was just trying to get stuff out for basic survival and 
it didn't matter who they were really ... there wasn't enough and the 
need was huge and one of the big things we faced ... was just the 
sheer logistics of getting stuff in there. 
Patton 
• Staffing Challenges 
Another flow on effect of the scale of the disaster was the difficulty that 
several NGOs report in attracting, retaining and training staff. This had 
implications for gender considerations because in some cases it was 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 
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necessary to deploy people who had no knowledge or experience of post-
disaster response or working with gender policies. 
We were pulling all our staff into Banda Aceh from around the world ... 
it really stretches an organisation even of our size, and we had existing 
offices, so for other NGOs who weren't there, having to set up from 
scratch quickly must have been a huge challenge. 
McKinlay 
There was constant recruitment all the time to try and keep the teams 
up to speed so that we could continue doing what we'd started doing. 
Bird 
It was an unusual situation for us too because we hadn't deployed 
anyone to an emergency before ... The scale of the emergency meant 
it was all hands to the pump ... I think that has been a continuing 
theme for the full year following in Aceh, has been to try and recruit and 
retain huge numbers of staff and huge turnover of staff ... over 50% of 
Oxfam staff have not worked for Oxfam previously so getting recruits 
up to speed with all the Oxfamness, Oxfam ways of working was a real 
challenge in itself and gender and development is just one of those. 
Person A 
In response to a question about what constraints existed to being able to 
implement gender policies and operate in a gender sensitive way, Bird refers 
to gender blindness among some of those recruited for specific tasks: 
I think usually it's just to do with blindness to the issue amongst the 
people that you are working with ... people who have never thought 
about the need to locate toilets sensitively so that women are not at 
risk of being assaulted going to the toilet during the night for example 
or where they can't be overlooked by men. 
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• Coordination Problems 
Finally, the scale of the disaster and subsequent level of response resulted in 
coordination difficulties due to so many actors arriving in the area. Three main 
implications of the lack of coordination are observed by participants. One is 
the problem of individuals or small groups arriving in Aceh who had no 
experience and their activities could not be monitored or subsequently 
assessed for impact. 
There were all these little, small NGOs that maybe existed or came into 
being because of the tsunami who had got a couple of hundred 
thousand dollars, went up there, didn't have a clue the way the system 
worked and they went scatter gun doing what they wanted and spent 
their money and cleared off and that was a huge problem and that 
made coordination of the whole relief effort very difficult. 
McKinlay 
Even after a month there were still people coming in and there were 
still more players turning up at every coordination meeting and from 
professional agencies on the one side to the scientologists on the other 
one. 
Chiswell 
This point is elaborated on more directly in relation to gender issues later in 
this chapter under the heading 'Media Coverage and Funding'. 
The second impact of the lack of coordination is that because so many groups 
were operating and the level of competition was high, there was doubling up 
of NGO activities and consequent inefficiencies. 
And that's a factor of coordination as well, actually. Why have 5 NGOs 
gone to that vii/age when one could have done it or a group of them in 
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one trip could have done it? 
Chiswell 
Again, this is something that is discussed later in relation to the issue of 
consultation, particularly with women, and the problem of "consultation 
fatigue". The duplication of work being done by NGOs was one of the 
criticisms levelled by the TEC (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). 
The third impact of the lack of NGO or government coordination is that the 
military assumed a coordinating role. 
I arrived in Meulaboh probably 6 days after the tsunami had happened 
and ADRA was the first NGO to actually register there. But within 24 
hours there were about 30 registered .. . once they started getting in 
there it was just like a tidal wave itself of NGOs ... it was about another 
10 days before the first UN agencies arrived there to help with 
coordination ... so coordination was being done purely by the military. 
Patton 
The issue of military coordination is discussed later in the chapter where 
several participants suggest the military had its own agenda and they allude 
to the clamp down on freedom of vulnerable people generally. 
Don Clarke, Director of Global Programmes at NZAID, also refers to the lack 
of coordination of the response effort. 
There was a huge issue of coordination ... the feedback I've heard time 
and time again from almost every possible source was about the 
proliferation of NGO activity on the ground and the lack of coordination 
and everyone carving it up and then reporting back to their market or 
their fundraising constituency in their home country and that was quite 
problematical. 
Clarke 
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Summary 
These comments show that in terms of challenges and experiences, 
organisations were struggling to meet basic needs in the immediate aftermath 
of the tsunami in Aceh. The magnitude of the disaster created a number of 
difficulties for NGOs including lack of resources, including staff, and 
coordination challenges. How the scale had implications for gender issues will 
become apparent throughout this chapter. 
The Gendered Impacts of the Tsunami 
Respondents identify some of the direct gender-specific impacts of the 
tsunami and the implications of those for their response. 
One of the key needs that was identified when I got there was that 
lactating women for instance had a major problem in that they had 
been breast feeding their babies. Just the sheer shock of what had 
happened plus there was limited water and limited food initially in those 
first few days. A lot of them were unable to breast feed. 
Patton 
Patton goes on to describe how ADRA provided infant formula in response to 
this need, a decision that he says attracted some criticism from other 
organisations. 
Participants note the number of women that were killed in the tsunami 
compared to men. 
A much higher percentage of children and women died in the tsunami 
than men anyway because they are more vulnerable and didn't have 
the strength to hold onto trees and buildings and whatever when the 
flood came in so you know the amount of women and children you are 
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dealing with is much smaller because of the circumstances of the 
emergency. 
Day 
Respondents observe how the disproportionate number of women dying 
impacted on later efforts to work with women. 
More women died than men so there was a bit of a gap ... there 
weren't women to work with, fewer women to represent women's 
issues and the women that were there were quite overloaded with the 
daily responsibilities that women had, so perhaps less able to 
participate in things over and above what they needed to do to keep 
their families going. 
Person A 
One of the things that got a lot of media attention was looking at the 
number of women who had died in the tsunami ... So that was the 
basis for some advocacy work on making everyone aware of how 
women had been affected differently by the disaster itself and then the 
aftermath of it. 
Bird 
Chiswell comments on the subsequent gendered impacts of the tsunami on 
those in IDP (internally displaced persons) camps: 
The trauma programme ... the uptake amongst women was very high, 
the uptake amongst men was far more difficult. The main reason being 
it was the women who were in the camps all the day, the men were out 
trying to fix things and so they were not actually able to partake in the 
social groups. 
This comment contrasts with the observations of another participant about 
men in camps. 
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My observations of going to the camp was that men were suffering the 
most because they had no work to go to and they were used to getting 
out of the home and going somewhere and doing men stuff and the 
women are used to be at home with the kids, you know. And so I think 
in some regards the men suffered in the camps because they were just 
lost. 
McKinlay 
This observation is notable because it is the only comment in all the 
discussions I had about gender issues that specifically identifies how men 
were impacted by the tsunami. This apparent lack of consciousness of men's 
issues is consistent with the literature that identifies the tendency of many 
organisations to continue to focus on 'women' rather than on 'gender,.31 
Other gender issues that emerged in the aftermath of the tsunami that 
organisations had to contend with include the trafficking of girls, ensuring 
school buildings were safe for girls, and issues of land ownership. 
We were particularly active in regards to getting the government to 
immediately establish a policy about children leaving the country 
without their parents ... because girls tend to be trafficked more than 
boys I would say that that is probably the most obvious intervention in 
relation to gender out of all that I saw. 
McKinlay 
That's a gender specific issue of enabling girls to feel safe at school 
and private which hadn't been taken into consideration in the 
reconstruction efforts. 
Day 
The issue around land, where people were going and how do you 
engage with, or help people who don't have secure land tenure ... that 
31 See for example MacDonald (2003). 
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was complicated with land ownership and whether women could own 
any land or it was typically in the name of the husband and if the 
husband was lost had she lost her land rights ... that's quite a big issue. 
Person A 
Summary 
The most immediate gender-related impacts of the tsunami observed by 
participants were that it killed many more women than men, and some 
surviving women experienced an inability to breastfeed due to trauma. One of 
the flow-on implications of the disproportionate number of male survivors was 
that there were fewer women to represent women's views. Participants also 
point to the different effects on men and women of living in lOP camps. Other 
gender issues emerged as the reconstruction process began, including: the 
problem of trafficking of girls; the need to ensure that girls' safety was taken 
into account as school buildings were rebuilt; and the complications of land 
ownership rights for women when it came to compensating people for land 
lost to the tsunami. 
Moving from Emergency Response to Reconstruction 
The comments below reveal that the way gender is treated tends to change 
as things move from the initial emergency phase to longer-term development. 
Respondents say that fieldworkers do have gender considerations in mind 
from the outset but that in the urgency of the immediate disaster aftermath, 
gender considerations beyond obvious practical gender needs are unrealistic 
in practice. These comments reflect what is observed in the literature on this 
subject, discussed in Chapter Two. 
Within the first few days of being there I was going to these lOP 
shelters and we were aware of the special needs of women and 
therefore we were looking at how do we cater to that so ... there were 
some unique needs based on gender that were being addressed in 
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those early stages. They are fairly basic if you like. It was more in your 
face stuff rather than the subtle gender needs that often you have to go 
looking for ... 
From experience, I know the text books might tell you otherwise, but 
from experience when you are in those first initial survival phases, you 
focus on survival rather than '" it is almost like gender is a luxury ... and 
it's not to say that it's not important but just sheer survival. 
Patton 
Another participant stresses the importance of having regard to gender issues 
from the outset. 
{Gender awareness] is essential {in the emergency phase] because 
everything is fast, it is critical, people die quicker ... everything is 
exacerbated, it's bigger, so it is essential ... You may even make more 
mistakes, but that is why you dedicate special resources to those 
things ... 'how many women and children are there? What do they do?' 
... If you don't really look at that thing in a special way you risk to 
forget, because they tend to be in the shade because they are weaker, 
because other people are stronger, they have the power, so if you don't 
pay special attention to them you have the big crisis. 
Benfatto 
Chiswell states that while gender is generally given consideration from the 
start, it takes time to understand the realities of a given context. He observes 
that sometimes an organisation's gender policies have little to do with the 
realities on the ground. 
Relevant to ... gender and gender response '" there are a lot of 
guidelines out there about how one should do things and there's a lot 
of ways of writing these things ... you can get away with blue murder 
.. , and with very little actual basis for writing them other than say 
general policy, if that makes sense ... I guess at the early stage there 
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was a lot of consideration being thought through about how women 
should be involved in the processes, but the practicalities of actually 
what would work and what wouldn't was yet to be found out. 
Chiswell 
Chiswell's statement is consistent with what the literature says about policies 
being developed far removed from actual practice and not being particularly 
relevant to realities on the ground?2 
The following comments indicate that it is only after the initial emergency 
phase that the real vulnerabilities and power struggles become apparent 
anyway, and that is the point when it becomes essential to focus more 
attention on gender. 
We certainly don't put [gender issues] aside ... at the back of your mind 
you always have the issue of 'how's this impacting women and 
children, the most vulnerable?' But in terms of the initial first 3 - 5 day 
response it's like a triage situation. It doesn't really matter whether they 
are male of female ... I didn't feel at all uncomfortable that that was 
causing discrimination with women and children ... 
. .. Next phase was shelter, water and food and the living conditions 
people had to survive in after the tsunami and that's where the women 
and children became vulnerable ... There's not a lot of intentional 
gender discrimination. As people struggle to help those who are 
vulnerable, who are in general without the necessities of life, there's 
generally a camaraderie that cuts across those gender issues in the 
early stages. But once people have survived that and are out the other 
side and then there is a scramble for resources ... it becomes then a 
power issue of who's in control of the rebuilding and who gets the 
contracts ... all of human nature comes back to the fore and you have 
32 See for example Hilhorst (2002) and Hovland (2003). 
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the potential for male dominance to override good judgement. 
Fletcher 
Fletcher also notes the importance of taking opportunities to address power 
issues following a major crisis. 
It's also a tremendous opportunity to take a community which has 
faced a major crisis, that has perhaps broken down some of those 
traditional values and say here's an opportunity to rebuild, but a new 
structure which does actually address those issues. So, at any stage I 
guess, of a stage of sudden trauma and change there's an opportunity 
to come out of it stronger and better by rebuilding something new and 
well structured or it retrenches back in again and allows the strong to 
dominate. 
Benfatto, on the other hand, cautions that while the emergency phase may be 
a good entry point for addressing gender inequalities, change cannot be 
expected to occur in that phase: 
[Often there are] cultural factors that it takes time to change, so if you 
think because it is an emergency people will start thinking different, 
good luck to you. These things take a very long time. Probably it is a 
good entry point. When you can consult better, you have the 
opportunities to introduce this sort of stuff, you can use it as an 
opportunity to introduce these things ... But if you limit it to the 
emergency things, you will not change it. 
This point echoes the study done by EI-Bushra & EI-Karib in 2002 (discussed 
in Chapter Two) that questions how realistic it is to bring about change in a 
post-conflict context when the opportunity appears to be the greatest. 
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Summary 
The above comments suggest that the challenge lies in recognising gender 
issues as they emerge over time after the initial disaster. The general 
experience of participants who were in Aceh in the immediate tsunami 
aftermath was that attention to gender became easier after the emergency 
phase when the focus was on basic survival. In the initial phase obvious 
gender issues were able to be addressed on a practical level, but the 
underlying, strategic gender needs take time to become apparent and 
understood, and are more likely to be able to be addressed once the urgency 
of the emergency is over. 
Media Coverage and Funding 
Two major factors identified by one participant that presented challenges to 
the implementation of gender policies, and attention to gender issues in 
general, were the intense media scrutiny and the unprecedented levels of 
funding available to NGOs. As Chiswell notes: 
If this had been Darfur or this had been just about any other response 
where the funding was of a lesser level, the work up of the 
programmes would be a bit different I think in terms of the outside 
accountability for what was being implemented ... I think the other thing 
that actually impacts on quality was the fact that there was such a high 
media scrutiny of it that they had to be seen to be moving ahead 
perhaps a lot quicker than what really is practical. And therefore the 
degree of rigour that's required to put in place a programme was less 
because everyone's looking at it and you just had to show that yes look 
I'm delivering things ... that did not help with the degree of rigour 
around women's issues, women's and gender issues. 
Clarke, agrees with this observation and adds: 
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Public pressure and the unrealistic expectation which is there in the 
media and there amongst politicians ... particularly in the Aceh case 
where so few international organisations were present on the ground 
[before the tsunami1 ... made it even more complicated. It made it more 
difficult to engage with local communities, and understand the local 
context and respond appropriately. Yeah, all those things did add up to 
a lot of rushed responses, which weren't well coordinated. 
Summary 
Because NGOs did not have to compete for funds to the extent they often do, 
and because the pressure to show results was so intense, respondents 
consider this directly resulted in a lack of rigour with which NGOs 
implemented their gender policies, the implication being that NGOs were less 
concerned with ensuring close adherence to gender policies, and there was a 
lack of external accountability. 
Consultation with Women 
The marginalisation of Acehnese women and the lack of consultation with 
them is one of the major criticisms of INGOs by Acehnese women 
themselves, by the TEC and by numerous others. 33 Participants in this 
research acknowledge that women were sidelined and comment on some of 
the issues around that. 
Chiswell notes there was a solid gender bias already within the community 
and agrees that: 
In the reconstruction model around housing, and things like that ... 
women did get left on the outside of a lot of those. 
33 For example: Eye on Aceh (2006) and Schulze (2005). 
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Gender is an important issue to be considered in the context of housing 
reconstruction. NZAID commissioned a report on gender issues in the post-
tsunami context (Habitat International Coalition, 2005). While the report 
focussed on Sri Lanka rather than Aceh, it shows the importance of paying 
attention to gender issues in humanitarian work. The criticisms contained in 
the report provide an opportunity for learning for future practice. 
They came out with a very damning report on the behaviour of 
international agencies in the way that they neglected or didn't pay due 
attention to the rights of women and children, both in the short term 
housing arrangements and camps and also in longer term housing 
reconstruction planning. I think it's a report that needs to be given 
profile and attention because it showed the way that, from the start, 
women and girls often suffered through the way that sanitation facilities 
and housing arrangements and so on were put together. And there's 
been a lot of consequences flowing out of that in terms of young 
marriages and HIVIAIDS and sexual harassment and so on ... so a 
quite hard hitting but I think pertinent report. 
Clarke 
Clarke points directly to gender as being one of the major overall failures of 
the international community in the tsunami response: 
And then at the heart of it all ... is the rights of women. I think it's 
fundamental, I mean it's fundamentally fundamental if I can say that 
and it's an area where the international community had let go of the 
ball a lot. 
Although there were legitimate concerns about the lack of consultation, 
Chiswell goes on to suggest that one reason (in addition to the lack of rigour 
due to surplus funding) might be that there came a point where beneficiaries 
were experiencing consultation fatigue due to the proliferation of NGOs: 
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'You are the fifth NGO that has come through asking the same 
questions' ... I've heard of examples of where communities say 'we 
don't want to talk about it any more just give us it'. 
Chiswell's comment is consistent with that made by de Ville de Goyet et al 
cited in Cosgrave (2007, p. 16) that " ... the people affected by the tsunami ... 
felt over-assessed but not consulted." 
Bird, while recognising the risk of consultation fatigue, hints at the difference 
between being assessed and being consulted and emphasises the 
importance of knowing what questions to ask. The challenge is getting the 
balance right. He says, 
[Knowing the right questions to ask] can avoid riots in camps. You've 
a/ways got to have antennae wiggling and be aware of the need not to 
assume that the first answer you're given ... is the definitive answer but 
to carryon asking and asking. But it is a difficult balance to strike 
because people of Aceh soon got fed-up with people asking questions 
and were like, 'aren't you here to help? Give us stuff' ... But by asking 
questions judiciously and in the right way you can avoid what can be 
really damaging consequences. 
In Person A's experience, consulting with women was not always practical 
given the cultural realities of the context and sometimes it can slow down and 
even threaten what an organisation is trying to achieve: 
Say for example you needed a water committee to work for the six 
months that the lOP camp is going to be open and you say 'we have to 
have 50% women on this', but the cultural reality is that women aren't 
listened to, don't have the skills, and by the time you create a voice for 
them within that community, and people are prepared to listen to them 
and respect them and train them with the skills to do it, you jeopardise 
what you were trying to achieve, which is a functioning water supply ... 
So you are already working in a difficult context and sometimes the 
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gender aspects of it can make it harder when you've got a short-term 
goal. I think if you're working on a longer-term project then you should 
absolutely do that. 
Chiswell observes that consultation with women occurred more easily and 
naturally when work was being done that was small in scope and at a grass 
roots level: 
In terms of gender issues ... around the JRS 34 response, I think 
because it was so grassroots, the meeting I went to with community 
leaders while I was there, there was a very strong presence of both 
men and women at that meeting providing it with the perspective of 
both. I think it was because it was small and manageable levels of 
funding that that did work ... The big responses will be led and run by 
men. The smaller community level responses there were far more, far 
better engagement for both. 
Summary 
Participants found it difficult to consult with women in Aceh for various 
reasons. They point to an existing gender bias within the community and say 
that the realities of the local context meant women don't have a voice and 
trying to create one for them can threaten short-term projects. Some point to 
the demand from the Acehnese people that INGOs stop asking questions and 
just provide things, which created a challenge to NGOs to know the right 
questions to ask in trying to balance that demand with the need to ensure 
proper consultation. One participant observes that better engagement with 
women occurred where NGO responses were smaller and had manageable 
funding levels, so were less likely to be controlled by men. 
34 Jesuit Refugee Service, an NGO funded by Caritas that was doing social work in Aceh 
before the tsunami hit. 
68 
Sharia Law 
Participants' experiences of Sharia law while in Aceh vary depending on when 
they visited. Those who were there immediately after the tsunami did not find 
Sharia restrictive. They speak of being aware of working in a Muslim society 
but that it did not directly affect their operations, in relation to gender or 
otherwise. It was those who visited Aceh later who observed Sharia restricting 
the ability of organisations to implement gender policies and programmes. 
This is not surprising since Sharia became more strictly enforced in mid-2005, 
following the tsunami. 
In those first few weeks there wasn't any impact ... there wasn't Sharia 
law practised at that point or wasn't enforced. I think everyone was 
mindful of the population we were working with were predominantly 
Muslim ... I'm not aware of any incidents or problems other than 
occasionally at coordination meetings there would be a reminder to 
people just to be conscious of the fact of where you were working, the 
population you were working with. 
Patton 
My background is working in Muslim/Arab countries anyway ... some of 
those forms of control of women and their accessibility to certain 
places, being able to travel for medical supplies or for food or whatever 
and the restrictions that were placed on them are part of the culture 
anyway. I didn't see anywhere in my brief exposure to it where that 
caused a problem for women, where they couldn't access supplies 
because their husbands said no or there were religions restrictions. 
Fletcher 
This observation is consistent with the views of another participant, that in the 
relief phase at least, women and girls probably had better access to resources 
than they were used to having. However, this comment is speculative rather 
than being based on direct observations. 
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In those situations generally boys and men get first preference with 
health care or any extra expenditure that's available within the family ... 
I'm sure that for lots of women and girls they were treated in a way that 
they got access to health care and they got access to food on an equal 
basis [during the relief phase] and I would imagine for many that would 
be not their traditional experience. 
McKinlay 
Chiswell describes how it was a challenge to find forums to talk to women 
directly. Empowering women was difficult because of the restrictions imposed 
on women by Sharia law. However, he notes that: 
Luckily for the first part of the response I think some of those 
restrictions were not so strong as they may be during peacetime. 
Although Aceh would be accused ... [of having] brought this upon 
themselves ... some imam was saying they brought this on themselves 
because they were behaving immorally. 
As noted in Chapter Three, this religious explanation for the tsunami 
propagated by the imams (religious leaders) usually placed the blame on 
women, and provided justification, in their view, for enforcing Sharia more 
strictly following the tsunami. Person A's comment below indicates how 
Sharia became more restrictive as time went on. 
Sharia law was really starting to raise its head and become a major 
limitation the amount women were able to speak out and participate in 
management of any of the things that were being set up. 
Person A 
I suppose overlaid on all of that you've got Sharia law that was in place 
in Aceh, so again there are questions there about how sensitively that 
was applied. 
Bird 
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Aceh is not very easy to work in gender ... it is very Muslim, the most 
Muslim of all of Indonesia. The introduction of Sharia law ... I'm sure it 
doesn't make things easier. 
Benfatto 
Summary 
The main effects of Sharia observed by participants were not in the initial 
emergency phase but later on. The challenge presented by Sharia was that it 
made it more difficult to actively include women, as they were less visible and 
available to participate because of the religious restrictions imposed on them. 
Impact of Military and Conflict 
Aceh was, and is, both a post-disaster and a post-conflict environment. Mostly 
respondents did not directly link the pre-existing conflict or the military 
presence to gender issues, but they did refer to them as being factors that 
impacted on their operations in Aceh. Four impacts are identified in the 
comments below. The first is the role the military assumed of coordinating the 
relief efforts and its attempts to control NGO activities as well as the local 
population. Patton observes that initially: 
Co-ordination was being done purely by the military. They had their 
own agenda at that point in time but they were really the only co-
ordinating body. 
He goes on to suggest somewhat cautiously that while there were no actual 
incidents that directly impacted on NGOs in the first few weeks, the military 
tried to take advantage of the situation and control NGO movements. He 
recalls the military reporting "incidents" and issuing warnings to NGOs in an 
attempt to limit their activities. 
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Other respondents express concerns about the military's control of tsunami 
victims in barracks. 
There seemed to have been an advantage taken of the unstable 
situation ... to actually clamp down on a number of community groups 
and their ability to return to their areas or a form of control through the 
use of refugee barracks and centres where they could be monitored ... 
and controlled ... I was concerned about some of the refugee areas 
where they were restricting people in order to control them, where they 
were forcing people to live in cramped conditions with little personal 
privacy, family privacy and using that as a way of saying that you can't 
go back to your areas because we want you, we need you here for 
humanitarian reasons, but really they were probably more control 
reasons. 
Fletcher 
The second impact of the pre-existing war identified by participants, is the 
conflicting role of the military in a post-conflict and post-disaster context and 
the threat that poses to the opportunity to address gender inequalities. 
In a civil war context, I think with local military involved who play both 
sides as humanitarian supporters plus the other, there is a confusion of 
roles and there's probably a far smaller window of opportunity for 
NGOs to come in and break that [gender discrimination and power 
issues}, and that was one of the things we tried to do in the tsunami 
response, to be careful to distance ourselves from the military. 
Fletcher 
[Barracks} were the temporary accommodation that were put up by the 
Indonesian Army and a lot of people had memories of the way in which 
those barracks were used as a kind of social control mechanism in 
Timor and so people were sceptical about whether there was some 
72 
additional agenda behind just providing emergency shelter for people. 
Bird 
Another respondent also mentions the wariness amongst Acehnese towards 
the military, which lay just below the surface. 
A lot of soldiers and soldiers' families got killed as well so '" there was 
common grieving and therefore a coming together. But I am sure as 
time went on it may have worn thin. But I didn't notice much, talked to 
people a bit, and they said: 'if you had seen what we had seen under 
this Indonesian Army, you wouldn't have pleasant thoughts about the 
Indonesian Army. , 
Smith 
The third impact of the pre-existing conflict is the need for NGOs to be aware 
of operating in a post-conflict environment. As Chiswell says, 
There was a complete loss of control by the military. They had also 
been hammered; they lost a whole battalion on the east coast ... So it 
required a degree of respect with the way the people negotiated and an 
understanding of who you were negotiating with and an understanding 
that this actually is a post-conflict environment as well. 
McKinlay articulates the fourth impact of the conflict on NGO activities in 
Aceh. He notes that because of the conflict, most organisations did not have 
pre-existing operations in Aceh, so it was more difficult for them to establish 
themselves in the wake of the tsunami: 
We were the only NGO that had an office there. All the other NGOs 
had been told to leave Aceh because of the religious [situation] and the 
fighting and UNICEF was the only office allowed to have a presence so 
we were there, we had contacts, we had programmes going, so 
probably more than anybody else we were able to hit the ground 
running. 
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Clarke agrees: 
Particularly in the Aceh case where so few international organisations 
were present on the ground ... It made it even more complicated. It 
made it more difficult to engage with local communities, and 
understand the local context and respond appropriately. 
Summary 
One of the challenges faced by NGOs of operating in the post-conflict 
environment was that their movements were somewhat restricted as the 
military sought to maintain control. Respondents also expressed concern that 
the movements of tsunami victims were restricted by the military, increasing 
victims' vulnerability. (The living conditions in the camps and barracks and the 
lack of security for women are discussed in Chapter Three). Respondents 
were aware of the need to be conscious of the post-conflict environment and 
careful in their dealings with the military. Learning some of the realities of the 
local context took time for some NGOs because they had no pre-existing 
experience in the area due to the long-running conflict. 
Gender Policies 
All NGOs that participated in this research have gender policies and/or 
subscribe to the Sphere Standards. Participants express a variety of views 
about gender policies and the value of those policies to the work they were 
doing in Aceh. 
Several respondents commented that the gender agenda is largely donor 
driven. 
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I think sometimes [gender policy] is almost a little bit over-egged, its 
frustrating when you are trying to build a water supply or whatever it is 
and someone is coming in and saying, 'so have you gender sensitised 
your database ... have you picked a female supplier- whoever you are 
buying your bricks from?' ... It just sometimes feels like it is rolled out 
to kind of almost become a dogma ... Because you've got people 
whose specific job is to look at gender, it can take on a life of its own 
beyond what practically needs to be done and there's lots of things to 
do with gender that are really deeply engrained in the culture. 
Person A 
[Gender] is mainstreamed in the organisation. It is part of the overall 
policy, every time you need to keep it in consideration because ... with 
NZAID's funds there's also questions - 'did you consider ... ?' So willing 
or not you have to keep it in consideration, if nothing else in your mind, 
you have to write down something. 
Benfatto 
Although the profile of gender is always present in everything that we 
do, I mean, donors for instance demand it in all of their proposals 
whether you like it or not, so there is always a certain profile within 
ADRA with regards to gender. It's more than ticking boxes, but if I was 
to be perfectly honest the driver is probably more the donor's 
requirements rather than the organisation driving it, but the 
organisation supports it. 
Patton 
The comments below reflect the tendency for gender policies to be broad in 
nature, but there is recognition of the need to be able to adapt those policies 
to a more specific context. 
Our policy here is probably quite general and broad to try and cover the 
fact that we work across a number of different situations ... There may 
be situations where a gender policy has to be written in a local context. 
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I think there are certainly different gender issues that face people in 
different cultures and different countries. 
Fletcher 
Policies tend to be quite overarching and in a way don't rule anything in 
or out. I mean that is not quite right, they do. They give you a guideline, 
a framework. But they don't answer all of your questions for you, you 
still have to figure it out ... It's not enough to go through the motions, 
you kind of have to feel it as well and some people do and some 
people don't and its probably a question of sensitivity; it is also a 
question of practice I think and experience in getting used to a way of 
thinking about things and a way of doing things. 
Bird 
As was noted by Bird and others under 'Staffing Challenges' earlier in this 
chapter, in many cases staff recruited did not have that experience. 
Participant responses in this section indicate that one of the challenges is 
being able to translate broad gender policies into something that is workable 
on the ground in a given context. As Bird suggests, it relies to some extent on 
people who are implementing the policy being able to "feel it" as they go. 
These observations are consistent with the calls in the literature for policies to 
be flexible enough to adapt to the realities of a given context. 35 
Some of the comments above suggest that gender is largely donor driven. 
While there is no direct evidence of this here, there is a risk that such 
perceptions may translate into implementing gender policies in a way that 
focuses on meeting donor requirements rather than on meeting beneficiaries' 
needs. 
Clarke discusses how in practice organisations are consistently falling short 
when it comes to implementing gender policy: 
35 See for example Kabeer (1999). 
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Agreement around gender mainstreaming and then just looking at the 
way it's played out and we're quite clear as an agency [NZAID] that it's 
played out through a lot of good policy and through a lot of good 
rhetoric but the practice substantially is not yet there. You know, all 
these years after Beijing ... it's a loss of momentum and leadership and 
institutional knowledge, and the thing we always look for ... we would 
expect to see in your strategic plan, next year's operational plan, and 
budgets, you know, especially in the budgets, some dollar signs which 
is saying that we are resourcing this in this way, training, research, 
staff, capability for engagement. If you can't see it in the budget, 
normally it's because it's not actually happening apart from rhetoric and 
policy level. And then it's assumed that it'll flow out and staff will pick it 
up in their work on the ground and so on. So that's one sort of crude 
measure we looked at to try and use. 
Clarke's comments throughout this section stress the importance of gender as 
a paramount issue in the humanitarian context. He also states unequivocally 
that the international NGO community failed in terms of gender issues in the 
tsunami response. He concedes the lessons learned from the tsunami around 
gender are the same as after previous major disasters. And given the findings 
of the TEC, later on in this chapter he lays down a clear challenge to the aid 
and development community in New Zealand to actually learn the lessons this 
time and keep them alive so that future practice is improved. 
Summary 
This section has identified the challenges and experiences of NZ NGO 
workers who went to Aceh following the tsunami, particularly in relation to 
gender issues and how those impacted on their ability to implement their 
gender policies. The experiences of participants in this research are 
consistent with the literature (reviewed in Chapter Two) that discusses 
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reasons why implementation of gender policies remains problematic, 
particularly in emergency contexts. 
The results show that for those working in the initial days after the tsunami, 
the scale of the disaster and the level of urgency was such that organisations 
were stretched to their limits in terms of resources and staff. This meant that 
gender issues were not a major consideration, beyond basic, obvious gender 
needs. For those who were in Aceh after the initial emergency period, gender 
issues became more apparent and required greater attention. For example, 
one of the major gendered impacts of the tsunami was the disproportionate 
number of women that died and consequently, participants found fewer 
women to consult with. 
Cultural and religious factors also noticeably impacted on the ability of 
participants to consult with women and implement their gender policies in the 
post-emergency phase. It was difficult to find forums to consult with women 
because women were busy with domestic responsibilities, restricted by Sharia 
law, and the reality was women did not have a voice, and attempting to create 
one for them at times threatened what NGOs were trying to achieve. 
Sharia law, as it became more strictly enforced in the months following the 
tsunami, had a noticeable impact on women's freedom and therefore their 
ability to participate in the reconstruction process. A further restriction on 
freedom was the level of military control, which affected both tsunami victims 
and NGOs, who felt their movements were to some extent controlled by the 
military. 
In addition to those context-specific factors, participants also observed 
external factors that impacted on their implementation of gender policies in 
Aceh, including: their own broad gender policies; the level of funding available 
to NGOs; and the amount of media scrutiny on their activities. Gender policies 
of NGOs tend to be broad in nature so as to be applicable in a range of 
circumstances. Being able to implement them in Aceh required an 
understanding of gender issues as they emerged in that context over time. 
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The ability of staff to "feel" their way is important and is something that comes 
with experience. Some respondents felt gender was largely a donor-driven 
issue, which may result in a misplaced focus on donor requirements rather 
than beneficiary needs. The amount of funding available for relief and 
development after the tsunami and the level of media scrutiny put pressure on 
NGOs to show results, which meant there was less rigour than usual around 
gender issues, and a lack of external accountability. 
The next section reveals what, if anything, NZ NGOs have done in response 
to those experiences in Aceh to capture learning for their organisations. 
Organisational Response and Learning 
Question: How did the sending organisations respond to those 
challenges and experiences to ensure that lessons 
were learned? 
The aim of this question is to find out how sending organisations captured the 
experiences of their staff that went to Aceh, to assist with learning lessons as 
an organisation to improve the quality of future practice. Two other sub-
questions emerge here: 
1. How have the participating organisations sought to learn lessons 
from their tsunami response? 
2. What specific lessons have been learned about gender? 
Learning from International Affiliates 
Most of the participant NGOs are engaged in various post-tsunami learning 
activities as part of their larger international networks. This is an important 
source of learning for NZ NGOs, as they tend to be smaller in size than their 
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counterparts from other countries and they are traditionally funding 
organisations rather than operational organisations. Below, participants 
discuss the value of the learning that has taken place at the international 
level. 
In October 2005 ... we did a major review of how we had responded ... 
We reviewed extensively how ADRA had managed it, what had we 
learnt ... and there have been quite significant changes in our planning 
and policies and that type of thing based on the findings of that summit 
... From memory I don't believe that gender was a component or a 
focus of that summit. Whether there were gender related issues that 
came up, I can't recall. 
Patton 
There is a committee based in Rome which I chaired . . . the 
International Cooperation Committee that basically looks at 
humanitarian policy procedure for the whole 172 members of the 
federation ... obviously one of the big pieces of work that came out of 
that was actually how do we capture the learning across dozens of 
responding Caritas organisations. We commissioned a number of 
studies, we then ... completely rewrote basically our procedure ... So 
that, the tsunami plus Dafur, plus, going right back to Gujarat 2001 ... 
we were basically able to take some of that learning and put it back up 
to the policy level and strategy .. . so now how do we operationalise 
those strategies ... Was there a gender specific strategy? No there 
wasn't, but there was certainly one around engagement and making 
sure that there was a far better consistency about how we deal with 
communities, with local church communities ... with vulnerables as a 
whole, with vulnerable people and communities ... basically you have 
to engage at gender level as well. So there was quite a big process 
that went up and it came down to policy and the tsunami fitted very 
nicely into that whole redevelopment and gave us a lot to think about. 
Chiswell 
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None of the participants in this research recall any specific learning about 
gender from their international affiliates. However, two organisations, Oxfam 
and World Vision, are still involved in a process of learning that relates directly 
to gender. Oxfam Aceh-Nias, operating through Oxfam Great Britain, is 
holding a conference in Aceh in mid-March 2008 to address the issue of 
gender equality in the emergency response. The conference seeks to learn 
how performance can be improved, recognising that even with gender 
mainstreaming often organisations fall short in practice. Staff from Oxfam 
organisations worldwide have been invited. While not initiated by Oxfam New 
Zealand, it is clearly a worthwhile learning opportunity on this issue in which it 
can participate. 
World Vision, although not otherwise direct participants in this research, 
advised me that World Vision International is in the process of preparing a 
report on gender in Aceh post-tsunami in collaboration with the Asia Research 
Institute. It was hoped the report would be available for inclusion in this 
research but I was recently informed that the release date has been 
postponed indefinitely. 
Aware of some of the major problems with the international tsunami response, 
NZAID wanted to have a voice at an international level as part of the formal 
evaluation. 
We deliberately chose not to do our own evaluation, but we became 
part of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition ... So, as well as having input 
into the thinking around the design of that whole exercise we also 
provided some funding for it as well and our particular focus in it was to 
support work around the engagement with local beneficiaries, the role 
that they played, you know in the local communities and population and 
the accountability of international agencies to those local communities 
or local beneficiaries. And also part of our funding which was quite 
small overall, that was also designed to make sure that the findings of 
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the global evaluation process reached local players on the ground for 
their benefit and their follow up. 
Clarke 
Clarke goes on to comment that the TEC findings about the impact of the 
tsunami on women and their subsequent role in the reconstruction of Aceh 
were consistent with feedback NZAID was getting from NZ NGOs. 
Bird, Development Programme Manager for Civil Society at NZAID, notes that 
many of the lessons being picked up by NZ NGOs are others' lessons rather 
than their own: 
It is for that reason that NZAID did get involved in the Evaluation 
Coalition. At least then we have a seat at the table. We are able to 
learn what can be learned out of the process and make sure that things 
were put on the table. But we are not really speaking from our own 
experience. We are speaking to the experience of others because we 
are a step or two removed. 
NZAID has drawn on lessons from the tsunami response in the drafting of its 
own Humanitarian Action Policy. 36 
We're just in the process of finalising it at the moment which has drawn 
quite a lot on the tsunami lessons, especially those from the Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition ... But, all the issues around paying attention to the 
rights and needs of women and children, making sure the human rights 
are there up front in the first moments of the response, that we are 
seeking to engage with and support local response and do it in a way 
that builds capacity and doesn't undermine local capacity. All those 
things are quite prominent in the principles and guidelines we set out in 
our policy draft. 
Clarke 
36 The NZAID Draft Humanitarian Policy is currently in a consultation period through to March 
2008. The draft policy is available on the NZAID website: ~~~~==~~. 
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Clarke observes that while the lessons have been picked up by NZAID and 
incorporated into their draft Humanitarian Action Policy, they are the same 
lessons that are being "learned" over and over again by the international 
community. The question is how to capture those lessons so that it translates 
into improved practice next time around. 
But in terms of deeper issues around a big international response in a 
situation like that, I suspect myself there's a lot of repeating of lessons, 
case after case. Hurricane Mitch, huge issues. Somalia, huge issues. 
Kosovo, Bosnia, huge issues. Asia tsunami, Pakistan earthquake and 
when you go back and look at the issues and the lessons they're the 
same issues and lessons ... the tsunami lessons really are the same 
lessons that pretty much come out of similar events over many, many 
years and so the challenge for the international community, and OCHA 
has a key role in this as the UN coordinating body, is to translate those 
issues into policy and practise and back it up in terms of resourcing 
and training and guidelines and standards and monitoring and holding 
organisations to account and so on ... So I have a strong sense myself 
that what's in the tsunami findings, we really need to stay with, and 
keep alive and just not let go as we move on to the next set of lessons 
or the next big events. I would like to see us for example and I guess 
it's the same challenge for NZ NGOs, to say lets really do something 
with this you know. This is the first set of findings that's quite so 
comprehensive, so multi-stakeholder and it's had so much profile. Let's 
do something. 
I mean they've [TEC] wound down and let go most of the capability that 
they had to put this together which then does raise that question about 
the monitoring of this follow up and the need for, at some point in-
country and maybe regionally and even globally, a subsequent stock 
take, to sit down and see what have we done with this, what has 
changed ... I know it's still alive for us here. We need to pay it more 
attention I think still. I know its still on the table for NZ NGOs and 
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they've got their own lessons too, that they drew for themselves. But 
it's probably using processes like the NORF, quarterly meetings with 
CIO, ongoing reporting with Programme Management Committee that 
HAF37 is receiving to keep the issues and lessons alive. 
Clarke 
One of the key considerations in the draft Humanitarian Action Policy is a 
commitment to ensuring lessons are learned, and it contains a section on the 
importance of accountability that commits NZAID to working with others, 
including civil society to ensure ongoing participatory learning processes. 
Summary 
Most respondent organisations report participating in a process of learning as 
part of their international networks. ADRA and Caritas identify significant 
changes to their policies based in part on lessons learned from the tsunami, 
although none of those lessons relate to gender as far as respondents can 
recall. NZAID too has drawn on the experience of the tsunami in the drafting 
of its Humanitarian Action Policy. 
Learning as Part of the NZ NGO Community 
The following comments discuss how a significant amount of the learning that 
has occurred has been across the NZ NGO sector. Chiswell states: 
The NGO community is very small in New Zealand ... there's a lot of 
discussion about learning whether its about gender or otherwise and 
how to do that effectively as a community. 
Clarke felt that, 
37 The Humanitarian Action Fund, administered by NZAID, is a contestable fund available to 
NZ NGOs who are involved in disaster and emergency responses through local partners. 
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From conversations and through the various discussions between our-
selves and the NGO community which followed the tsunami there was 
quite a period of engagement and interaction for the year or eighteen 
months afterwards ... 
... And what happens is that there is quite a close working relationship 
between the Council for International Development and the Programme 
Management Committee which looks after the HAF, and the 
Programme Management Committee keeps an eye on '" emerging 
issues or common issues or gaps from across all the programmes that 
they are responsible for overseeing ... and if certain issues emerge 
where there's obviously a bit of a need across the sector or a bit of a 
gap ... that'll be fed into the discussion of the Council for International 
Development which then feeds it into its own annual, pretty extensive, 
comprehensive training and support programme for NZ NGOs. So, 
that's the way that learning and lessons can be picked up and taken 
out ... So reporting has a dual function of accountability and assurance 
for use of public funds and also a function around learning and doing 
better ... I'm not aware of, for example, whether there are any 
particular issues that have come out and been taken forward around 
gender issues and rights. 
Clarke considers there are good systems for information sharing and learning 
across the sector. He refers to the NDRF 38 , which meets regularly, the 
Programme Management Committee and other annual meetings that NZAID 
holds with NGOs. So NZAID is part of the sector wide process of reporting, 
planning, prioritising and capacity building. 
As Bird comments, 
I think the sector will continue to grow and I think there's a very good 
spirit of collegiality and again an assumption of goodwill all round ... 
38 Non-government Organisations Disaster Relief Forum, hosted by the Council for 
International Development (CID) in Wellington. 
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That's a very good forum for sharing lessons ... I think there's quite a 
strong culture of learning actually and increasingly it's learning our own 
lessons rather than recycling other people's lessons. 
Summary 
Respondents consider that the NGO community in New Zealand, being small, 
provides a good forum for sharing information and learning lessons. However, 
respondents were not able to point to any gender-related lessons that had 
been learned in this context. 
Learning as an Organisation 
In addition to participating in the learning of their international affiliates, and 
sharing lessons with the NGO community in New Zealand, the following 
comments reveal what NZ NGOs have done to capture their own learning. 
The statements indicate that there tend not to be comprehensive systems in 
place for learning within the organisations, but that learning relies more on 
informal channels or is part of annual reflection processes. 
I think what we do typically for any of our travel [is] we often present 
within our internal staff meetings. If there's anything, crucial lessons 
learned that would affect our engagement in these things more then it 
kind of gets rolled into our annual reflection process. So each year we 
have an annual reflection on stuff we've supported during the year, 
what some of the major findings of that are and that leads into planning 
for the next year, so things come up out of that. A lot of that is more 
related to the mechanics of how we engage in that type of big 
international response rather than the learnings on the ground of 
contextual and programme related stuff. 
Person A 
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At a regular time every year or every certain period you review those 
things there so you check, basically you are monitoring and learning 
process ... You see where the issues are and if you have issues you 
try to adjust your programme accordingly. Everybody shares their 
experience whatever it is and often we learn from each other and we 
are able to introduce what we've been learning from the process. 
Benfatto 
Benfatto went on to comment that what tends to happen is that people get 
together and discuss and review on an informal basis and hopefully learn in 
that way from each other, but: 
It is not systematic and I am not really sure how much is retained. 
The lack of a systematic approach referred to above is also identified by 
another participant. 
What do you do with your lessons learned, how do they change from 
policy and from policy into action? And how do you not lose them? As a 
small organisation, I guess a certain amount of those lessons learned 
are sort of stuck in my head and in a way to be discussed and 
transferred into policy and documentation and so forth ... It will come 
through in the observations you make on project design and 
implementation in the field, both formally and informally through that 
sort of process. 
Fletcher 
One of the problems identified in the literature is that reviews and reports get 
done, but they end up sitting on a shelf somewhere. 39 Referring to the tsunami 
lessons learned summit held by ADRA, Fletcher, who did not attend the 
summit himself, comments: 
39 See for example Power, Maury and Murray (2002). 
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The flow of information hasn't been as good as I would have liked but 
they have at least done it and it is sitting somewhere. We can probably 
access it if we were desperate. 
On the issue of reporting and learning lessons, Clarke comments: 
The tendency is so easy to let it go and then to reinvent it. .. And then 
staff changeover and institutional memory is lost and people know this 
is somewhere on the file or sitting on the shelf, but ... 
Summary 
So in terms of what organisations did to capture the experiences of their staff 
who visited Aceh, participants recall presenting to other staff or writing 
reports, but they were vague on what subsequently happened to the 
information. Many participants themselves struggled to recall what they might 
have learned. As with the wider learning forums, none of the participants 
could point to any specific gender-related learning to emerge within their 
organisations from their tsunami response activities in Aceh. Learning within 
organisations tends to be informal and ad hoc. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
such informal learning processes are important but on their own are 
insufficient to ensure lessons are properly learned. 40 
Barriers to Learning 
Question: What, if any, obstacles to learning exist within the participant 
NGOs? 
40 Hailey and James (2002). 
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Participants reveal a number of barriers to learning that exist within their 
organisations and across the sector, including: the level of staff turnover, a 
lack of resources to devote to learning activities; and the extent to which 
learning depends on the level of commitment by the programme director of 
the time. 
1. Staff Turnover 
The programme directors change, that's a significant thing of course 
because of learning, every time there is turnover you lose information. 
Benfatto 
[Staff turnover] is a huge problem. It's actually a sector wide problem in 
my opinion ... So that is a structural problem for the NGO community. 
Chiswell 
The problem of staff turnover is identified in the literature on this subject as 
being one reason why organisations seem not to be able to capture learning 
and why they do not devote more resources to learning.41 
2. Lack of Resources 
Respondents comment on the lack of resources available to commit to 
learning. At the time of the tsunami it was unusual for NZ NGOs to have a full 
time humanitarian programme manager. Person A comments that when she 
went to Aceh the nature of her role meant she did not have much time to 
devote to learning activities. 
41 See for example Richardson (2006). 
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At that stage I was doing the job only 20% of my time, so by the time I 
had filled the reporting requirements I had pretty much blown my time 
on it. 
Person A 
NZ humanitarian agencies were very much ... postbox, you put your 
cheque in here and we '/I send it on type response. I was the first 
humanitarian programme manager for any NGO in NZ . . . the 
government grant they used to get was $125,000 of which 1% could be 
used for admin. So you cannot build a structure that will learn in the 
humanitarian sector based on 1 % admin .. .[Caritas NZ] had more 
capacity than just about everyone else to learn our lessons and we 
were pretty well swamped. OK, so how much did everyone else learn? 
. .. Having dedicated humanitarian capacity is a bit of a luxury for an 
agency the size of Caritas. But what has also changed is that ... for the 
community as a whole there is now 3-5% for AM & ~2 within the new 
HAF guidelines and there's 5% allocation of grants for administration, 
so basically now there is human resource available to be able to do 
that type of learning. 
Chiswell 
In the case of the core of larger professional NZ NGOs [it] has gone 
beyond being mere letterboxes gathering public funds, a government 
subsidy added on and then it goes as a cheque more or less to 
international counterparts. There is far more genuine engagement to 
and fro including field visits ... You've still got overall small capability 
compared with the bigger international community. 
Clarke 
The extent to which NZ based NGOs are able to have an impact on the 
way programming happens is quite limited. Development and 
humanitarian professionals based with NZ NGOs here will certainly be 
42 Appraisal, Monitoring and Evaluation. 
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heard in conversations with their international affiliates, but in terms of 
affecting programming on the ground we are quite a long way away 
from that. 
Bird 
3. Level of Leader Commitment 
Benfatto states that evaluation in reference to gender is donor driven and it is 
something that depends to a certain extent on the programme director at the 
time as to how much they invest in it. This comment is consistent with the 
literature on organisational learning that stresses the importance of the leader 
when it comes to how well an organisation learns.43 
Summary 
These findings show that organisations have responded to the challenges and 
experiences of working in Aceh to ensure they are learning lessons at three 
different levels. First, NZ NGOs have participated (and continue to participate) 
in summits and conferences as part of their international networks and draw 
lessons from that source. Although the tsunami has contributed to policy 
changes at the international level in a number of organisations, no participants 
could identify any particular gender-related lessons at that level. 
Second, NZ NGOs engage with each other and with NZAID to share 
information and learn lessons. Again, none of the participants were able to 
point specifically to any gender-related lessons. 
Third, participant NGOs learn within their organisations, from their staff 
experiences. However, the findings show that they rely heavily on informal 
processes. Learning is not done systematically or formally except to the 
43 See for example Hailey and James (2002). 
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extent that it is confined to annual review processes. No respondents were 
able to identify any gender-related lessons learned by their organisations. 
Three main barriers to learning within organisations are identified: the level of 
staff turnover; the lack of resources; and the level of commitment to learning 
by the programme director. 
These findings reflect the reality that NZ NGOs are primarily funding 
organisations and are consistent with comments that they have not 
traditionally had the resources to learn their own lessons from their own 
experiences. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
The international humanitarian response in Aceh after the tsunami has been 
criticised in relation to its lack of proper attention to gender issues, among 
other things. The criticism has come from a number of sources including 
donors and beneficiaries, particularly the women of Aceh. INGOs are 
accountable to both. Being accountable requires that organisations devote 
time and resources to actively learn lessons from the Aceh experience to 
ensure that they improve their future performance. 
This research is not an assessment of the effectiveness of the gender policies 
of NZ NGOs or the extent to which they were or were not implemented in 
Aceh. Instead, it has sought to reveal and analyse some of the challenges 
and experiences that workers of NZ NGOs faced in post-tsunami Aceh in 
relation to gender issues and how those NGOs have responded to ensure 
lessons have been learned. Only five NGOs, out of the seventeen known to 
have been involved in some way in the tsunami response, have participated in 
this research. Therefore, the findings relate only to those five NGOs and 
cannot be more broadly applied. 
To carry out this study three broad subject areas have been explored: gender 
and development; post-tsunami Aceh; and organisational learning. 
Gender and Aceh 
Consideration of gender issues is a crucial element of effective disaster 
response and sustainable development, and the widespread 
acknowledgement of its importance is reflected in the literature, in the 
numerous codes and charters that INGOs subscribe to and in those 
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organisations' own policies. However, despite over fifteen years of gender 
mainstreaming by INGOs, they continue to struggle to translate policies into 
practice. 
One of the many reasons identified for the difficulty in implementing gender 
policies is that they are not sufficiently flexible or adaptable to the realities of 
the various local contexts in which INGO workers find themselves. 
Participants in this research comment that policies tend to be broad in nature 
and it takes time to appreciate and understand the local gender dynamics and 
issues and therefore how gender policies might be best applied in that 
context. Some also felt that gender, while important, was largely donor driven 
and was not necessarily always relevant or applicable to what organisations 
were trying to achieve on the ground in the short term. 
It is widely recognised that major traumatic events like the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami create windows of opportunity for addressing gender inequalities and 
unless steps are taken to that effect from the outset of any disaster response, 
there is a risk that gender inequalities will become further entrenched. Gender 
policies need to go far beyond attending to the practical gender needs. They 
must seek to address long-term strategic needs by taking into account the 
underlying power structures that perpetuate inequalities. But, as this research 
has shown, in the urgency of an emergency situation like the initial days 
following the tsunami in Aceh, gender is seen as a luxury consideration and 
can easily become sidelined in the rush to deliver aid. While practical gender 
needs can be addressed, strategic gender needs cannot, because not only 
are they not recognised or well understood initially, but also there are simply 
not the resources available to devote to the more complex issues of 
underlying structural gender inequalities. 
As things moved beyond the initial emergency in Aceh, gender inequalities 
became more apparent and were better understood in their cultural and 
religious contexts. However, as the issues emerged, the forces that impact 
most on gender inequalities and against which NGOs have to work, also 
gained prominence. For example, participants point to the stricter 
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implementation of Sharia law and the controlling tendencies of the military in 
the months following the tsunami as being factors that made it difficult to 
implement gender policies. Their presence restricted the ability of women to 
participate in the reconstruction process. 
Another reason why organisations struggle to implement policies in practice is 
that staff are often insufficiently trained. Some of the respondents in this 
research commented on how difficult it was to draw enough staff into Aceh 
after the tsunami to cope with the level of need, and often they had to work 
with and rely on people, particularly technical experts, who had no experience 
with or understanding of the importance of gender considerations. 
Although sometimes lack of resources is cited as a reason why gender is not 
given sufficient attention, in post-tsunami Aceh the extraordinary level of 
funding that was available to organisations was identified by a couple of 
respondents as actually contributing to the lack of rigour around gender 
standards that would normally be expected in a post-disaster environment. 
Because organisations did not have to compete for funds and because of the 
pressure on them to disburse funds quickly and show tangible results, gender 
standards were not adhered to. 
In addition to the difficulties of implementation, there has also been a 
noticeable loss of momentum in the international humanitarian community 
around the issue of gender. This has been described as 'GAD fatigue', 
evidenced by the lack of commitment in terms of time and budget allocations 
within organisations to ensure it remains a paramount consideration. In light of 
the numerous reports criticising the overall international gender response in 
Aceh, and the specific challenges identified by participants in this research, it 
is notable that to date not a single lesson relating to gender has been drawn 
from NZ NGOs post-disaster experiences in Aceh. This research did not 
consider in any depth the level of commitment to gender within the 
participating organisations, but further research that involves a systematic 
assessment of how committed NZ NGOs are to the mainstreaming of gender 
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policies, looking at factors such as investment in staff training, policies and 
procedures, and budget allocations over time would be useful. 
Organisational Learning 
As noted above, accountability and learning go hand in hand. Learning is 
essential to an organisation's continued viability. Organisations need to 
ensure they learn lessons so that they are continuously improving their 
performance and not repeatedly making the same mistakes at the expense of 
those they are trying to help. To learn effectively, organisations need to put 
systems in place to ensure knowledge and experience is captured. Learning 
must be active and continuous. 
The best opportunities for learning exist following a major disaster because 
the impetus is at its strongest and the issues are at the forefront of people's 
minds. In trying to determine whether any lessons have been learned from the 
tsunami, this research looked at what the responding organisations do to 
learn lessons. The research shows that learning comes from three main 
sources: the organisation's international affiliates as lessons are passed 
down; sharing learning among NGOs across the sector in New Zealand 
through a variety of fora; and learning within their own organisations. 
NZ NGOs are traditionally fund raising organisations rather than implementing 
organisations, so they have tended to primarily learn the lessons of others, 
not having their own experiences to draw on. They pick up the wider lessons 
learned from their international affiliates. They also engage with other NGOs 
in New Zealand and share lessons that way. The NDRF44 is one such open 
forum for shared learning. But as more organisations now have full time 
humanitarian programme managers and are developing their capacity to 
respond to humanitarian disasters they will increasingly be drawing lessons 
from their own experiences and will need to ensure they have systems in 
place for effective learning. This research has shown that the participating 
44 Non-government Organisations Disaster Relief Forum 
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organisations currently do not have robust internal structures for systematic, 
continuous learning. Respondents identify staff turnover, lack of resources, 
and variable leadership commitment to learning as being three of the main 
barriers to learning within their organisations. 
The impact of staff turnover on organisational learning and knowledge in NZ 
NGOs is suggested by a number of participants to be a significant problem for 
the sector. Further research into this issue would be useful to assess the 
actual extent and impact of it and to investigate ways losses to organisations 
in the form of knowledge and learned lessons can be mitigated. 
Participants in this research were not able to recall any particular gender 
related lessons learned by them or their organisations as a result of their work 
in Aceh, except perhaps Chiswell's passing observation that the most 
successful projects in his experience tended to be those that were small in 
scale with lower levels of funding because they did not end up being 
controlled by men, and women were able to be actively involved in them. 
NZAID contributed to the TEC evaluation and recognises there were major 
failings around gender. It is currently developing its own Humanitarian Action 
Policy, which draws generally on lessons learned from the tsunami. 
While this research has not revealed any specific gender-related lessons 
learned by NZ NGOs from post-tsunami Aceh, it has highlighted from an NZ 
NGO perspective the particular challenges and difficulties faced in that 
context. If NZ NGOs continue to develop their humanitarian response 
capabilities and become increasingly operational in an international 
environment that is demanding better accountability from NGOs, it will be 
essential that they become better learning organisations as they draw more 
and more lessons from their own experiences. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Question Guide 
Fieldworkers 
1. When did you work in Aceh? 
2. What was your role at that time? 
3. Had your organisation worked in Aceh prior to the tsunami? 
4. What relief/development activities were you engaged in there? 
5. Were they the activities you went there to do? 
6. Did your organisation have gender polices for implementation as 
part of your work? 
7. If so, what was your experience of implementing them? What were 
the challenges to implementation? 
8. If not, what was your experience of gender issues generally as they 
related to the work you were doing? 
9. If you had gender policies to implement, were they able to be 
adapted to the local context as required? 
10. Did you receive any gender training? 
11. Did the demands of the context lead to you venture into activities 
outside your normal area of expertise? 
12. Did you go through some kind of debriefing process upon your 
return to New Zealand? 
13. Did you or your organisations learn any lessons in respect of 
gender? 
NGO Representatives 
1. When did your organisation work in Aceh? 
2. Does your organisation have any history of working in Aceh? 
3. How many personnel did you send to Aceh? 
4. What relief/development activities was your organisation involved in 
there? Are they different from the usual types of work you do? 
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5. Did your organisation partner with any local organisations as part of its 
tsunami response? 
6. Did your organisation have a gender policy when it went to Aceh? 
7. How have you monitored the implementation of your gender policy? 
8. How has your organisation responded to the experience of working in 
Aceh in terms of gender issues? 
9. What do you see as the constraints to gender policy implementation in 
Aceh? 
10. Have any changes been made to your gender policy or procedures as 
a result of your organisation's experience of working in Aceh? 
11. How is your gender policy shaped? Is it set by the international parent 
organisation? 
12. Did any of your staff receive gender training for their work in Aceh? 
13. What has your organisation done to capture the experiences of the 
staff it sent to Aceh? 
14. How does your organisation learn lessons generally? 
15. What factors make learning difficult? 
16. Have you learned any lessons relating to gender from Aceh? 
NZAID Staff 
1. What are the gender related challenges of working in Aceh from 
NZAID's point of view? 
2. Is NZAID aware of any issues related to the implementation of gender 
policies in Aceh? 
3. What has NZAID's response been to the criticisms of the international 
disaster relief response in Aceh, if any? 
4. Does NZAID have a view about the performance of NZ NGOs in Aceh? 
5. Does NZAID have a view about how gender policies can be 
implemented effectively in such an environment? 
6. In NZAJO's view, how good are NZ NGOs at learning? Are there good 
systems within organisations and across the sector? 
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7. Is NZAID aware of any lessons that have been learned in respect of 
gender? 
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